

QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE

DE VERITATE

Question I

Article 1

Quid est veritas? What is truth?

Videtur autem quod verum sit omnino idem quod ens. Augustinus in *Lib. Solil.* dicit, quod verum est id quod est. Sed id quod est, nihil est nisi ens. Ergo verum significat omnino idem quod ens.

Respondens dicebat quod sunt idem secundum supposita, sed ratione differunt. Contra, ratio cuiuslibet rei est id quod significatur per suam definitionem. Sed id quod est, assignatur ab Augustino, ut definitio veri, quibusdam aliis definitionibus reprobatis. Cum ergo secundum id quod est, convenient verum et ens, videtur quod sint idem ratione.

Praeterea, quaecumque differunt ratione, ita se habent quod unum illorum potest intelligi sine altero: unde Boetius in libro de hebdomadibus dicit, quod potest intelligi Deus esse, si separetur per intellectum paulisper bonitas eius. Ens autem nullo modo potest intelligi si separetur verum: quia per hoc intelligitur quod verum est. Ergo verum et ens non differunt ratione.

Objections

1. It seems that the true is in every way the same as being. Augustine says in the *Soliloquies*: “The true is that which is.” But that which is, is nothing other than being. The true, therefore, signifies in every way the same object as “being”.

2. It was said in reply that the true and being are the same according to supposit but differ according to intelligible rationale. On the contrary, the rationale of any thing whatsoever is that which is signified through its definition. But “that which is”, as asserted by Augustine, is the definition of the true, and he rejects all other definitions. Therefore, since the true and being agree according to that which is [i.e., the same supposit], it seems they are the same in intelligible rationale.

3. Further, things differing in intelligible rationale are so related to each other that one of them can be understood without the other: whence Boetius says in the *De hebdomadibus* that the existence of God is able to be understood if His goodness is momentarily separated from Him through the understanding. Being, however, is unable in any mode to be understood if separated from the true: because being is understood through the fact that it is true.

Therefore “true” and “being” do not differ according to intelligible rationale.

Praeterea, si verum non est idem quod ens, oportet quod sit entis dispositio. Sed non potest esse entis dispositio. Non enim est dispositio totaliter corrumpens, alias sequeretur: est verum, ergo est non ens; sicut sequitur: est homo mortuus, ergo non est homo.

4. Further, if the true is not the same as being, it is necessary that it be a disposition of being. But it cannot be a disposition of being, for it is not a disposition which totally corrupts, else this would follow: “It is true, therefore it is not being”, as it follows: “This man is dead, therefore, this is not a man.”

Similiter non est dispositio diminuens, alias non sequeretur: est verum, ergo est; sicut non sequitur: est albus dentes, ergo est albus. Similiter non est dispositio contrahens, vel specificans: quia sic non converteretur cum ente. Ergo verum et ens omnino sunt idem.

5. Similarly, the true is not a disposition that diminishes, otherwise this would not follow: “It is true, therefore it is”; just as it would not follow: “[this thing] has white teeth, therefore it is white.” And similarly, it is not a disposition which contracts or specifies: because thus it would not be convertible with being. Therefore being and true are in every way the same.

Praeterea, illa quorum est una dispositio, sunt eadem. Sed veri et entis est eadem dispositio. Ergo sunt eadem. Dicitur enim in II Metaphysic.: dispositio rei in esse est sicut sua dispositio in veritate. Ergo verum et ens sunt omnino idem.

6. Further, those things of one disposition are the same. But the true and being are in the same disposition. Therefore, they are the same. For as it is said in *Metaphysics* 2: “the disposition of a thing in its act of existence is the same as its disposition in truth.” Therefore, the true and being are in every way the same.

Praeterea, quaecumque non sunt idem, aliquo modo differunt. Sed verum et ens nullo modo differunt: quia non differunt per essentiam, cum omne ens per essentiam suam sit verum; nec differunt per aliquas differentias, quia oporteret quod in aliquo communi genere convenirent. Ergo sunt omnino idem.

7. Further, whatever things are not the same differ in some manner. But the true and being differ in no manner. They do not differ through essence, since every being is true through its very essence; nor do they differ through other differences, because they must convene in some common genus. Therefore, they are in every way the same.

Item, si non sunt omnino idem, oportet quod verum aliquid super ens addat. Sed nihil addit verum super ens, cum sit etiam in plus quam ens: quod patet per philosophum, IV Metaphys., ubi dicit quod: verum definientes dicimus quod dicimus esse quod est; aut

8. Likewise, if they were not in every way the same, it would be necessary that the true adds something to being. But the true adds nothing upon being, even though it has greater extension than being: which is made clear by the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 4, where he says: “we define the

non esse quod non est; et sic verum includit ens et non ens. Ergo verum non addit aliquid super ens; et sic videtur omnino idem esse verum quod ens.

Sed contra, nugatio est eiusdem inutilis repetitio. Si ergo verum esset idem quod ens, esset nugatio, dum dicitur ens verum; quod falsum est. Ergo non sunt idem.

Item, ens et bonum convertuntur. Sed verum non convertitur cum bono; aliquod est enim verum quod non est bonum, sicut aliquem fornicari. Ergo nec verum cum ente convertitur, et ita non sunt idem.

Praeterea, secundum Boetium in libro de hebdomadibus: in omnibus creaturis diversum est esse et quod est. Sed verum significat esse rei. Ergo verum est diversum a quod est in creatis. Sed quod est, est idem quod ens. Ergo verum in creaturis est diversum ab ente.

Praeterea, quaecumque se habent ut prius et posterius, oportet esse diversa. Sed verum et ens modo praedicto se habent, quia, ut in libro de causis dicitur, prima rerum creaturarum est esse; et Commentator in eodem libro dicit quod omnia alia dicuntur per informationem de ente, et sic ente posteriora sunt. Ergo verum et ens sunt diversa.

Praeterea, quae communiter dicuntur de causa et causatis, magis sunt unum in causa quam in causatis, et praecipue in Deo quam in creaturis. Sed in Deo ista quatuor, ens, unum, verum et bonum, hoc modo

true as that which affirms the existence of what is, and denies the existence of what is not.” And thus, the true includes both being and non-being. Therefore, since it does not add anything on to being, it thus seems to be in every way the same as being.

On the contrary

1. Meaninglessness is the useless repetition of the same thing. If, therefore, the true were the same as being, it would be meaningless to say: “being is true”—which is false. Therefore, they are not the same.

2. Likewise, being and the good are convertible. But the true is not convertible with the good; for some things are true but not good, such as fornication. The true, therefore, and being are not convertible, and therefore they are not the same.

3. Further, in all creatures, according to Boethius in the *De hebdomadibus*: “in all creatures, the act of existence and what is are diverse.” But the true signifies the existence of things. Therefore, in creatures the true is different from that which is. But that which is, is the same as being. Therefore, in creatures the true is diverse from being.

4. Further, it is necessary for whatever things are related as before and after to be diverse. But the true and being are related in the aforesaid mode, because, as is said in *The Book of Causes*: “the first of all created things is the act of existence”, and, the Commentator in the same place says: “all other things [than being] are predicated as a information [or specification] of being”, and thus, are posterior to being. Therefore, the true and being are diverse.

5. Further, those things which are commonly predicated of cause and the caused are more united in the cause than in the caused, and more so in God than in creatures. But in God, these four—being, the one, the true, and the good—

appropriantur: ut ens ad essentiam pertineat, unum ad personam patris, verum ad personam filii, bonum ad personam spiritus sancti. Personae autem divinae non solum ratione, sed etiam re distinguuntur; unde de invicem non praedicantur. Ergo multo fortius in creaturis praedicta quatuor debent amplius quam ratione differre.

Respondeo, dicendum, quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum.

Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens; unde probat etiam philosophus in III Metaphys., quod ens non potest esse genus, sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super ens, in quantum expriment modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur. Quod dupliciter contingit:

uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis. Sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera. Substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam differentiam, quae designet aliquam naturam

are appropriated in this manner: being pertains to the essence; the one to person of the Father; the true to the person of the Son; and the good to the person of the Holy Spirit. Since the divine Persons are distinct not only by intelligible rationale but also according to reality, these rationales cannot be predicated of each other. Therefore, *a fortiori*, these four predicates ought to differ in more than intelligible rationale as they are in creatures.

Response

I respond, it must be said that, just as it is necessary in treating of demonstrable things to make a reduction to some principle which is *per se nota* [known through itself] to the intellect, so too in investigating “what” anything is; otherwise, each kind of investigation would regress infinitely, and thus every science and cognition of things would perish.

That which the intellect conceives first as most knowable, and into which it resolves all conceptions, is being, as Avicenna says in the beginning of his *Metaphysics*. Whence it is necessary that all other conceptions of the intellect are constituted from an addition to being. But being is not able to be added to by something external to it, in the mode by which differences are added to genera, or accidents to a subject, because every nature essentially is being; whence the Philosopher proves in *Metaphysics* 3 that being is not able to be a genus: but something is said to add upon being in this sense, insofar as it expresses a certain mode of being which the name of “being” does not express. And this happens in two ways:

first, as the mode expressed is some special mode of being. For there are diverse grades of being, according to which there are taken up diverse modes of being, and it is by these that there are taken up diverse genera of things. For substance does not add something upon being as some difference, which designates some nature superadded to

superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in aliis generibus.

Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in se; alio modo secundum quod consequitur unum ens in ordine ad aliud. Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter quia vel exprimitur in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative. Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente, nisi essentia eius, secundum quam esse dicitur; et sic imponitur hoc nomen res, quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio *Metaphys.*, quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem vel essentiam entis. Negatio autem consequens omne ens absolute, est indivisio; et hanc exprimit hoc nomen unum: nihil aliud enim est unum quam ens indivisum.

Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid: dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid; unde sicut ens dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se, ita dicitur aliquid, in quantum est ab aliis divisum. Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente: hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia, ut dicitur in III de anima. In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum, ut

being, but the name of substance expresses a certain special mode of being, namely, being through itself. And likewise it is in the other genera [i.e., the categories].

The other mode is that expressed mode which is a general mode following upon every being; and this mode can be taken in two ways: first, in the mode according to which something follows upon every being in itself; second, the mode according to which something follows upon one being in ordination to another. In the first mode, this is itself twofold because it expresses something in being either affirmatively or negatively. There is not something found which is affirmatively said absolutely that is able to be accepted in every being, except the essence of it, according to which it is said to be; and thus is imposed the name “thing” [res], which differs in this regard from *being*, according to Avicenna in the beginning of his *Metaphysics*, for being is taken up from the act of existing [*actus essendi*], but the name “thing” expresses the quiddity or essence of the being. The negation following upon every being considered in itself is indivision; and this is expressed by the name “one”: for “one” is nothing other than “being undivided”.

If the mode of being is taken in the second way—namely, according to the relation of one to another—this is able to be in a twofold manner. The first mode is according to the division of one thing from another; and this is expressed by the name “something” [*aliquid*]: for “something” is said as “another what” [*aliud quid*]: whence, just as a being is said to be one, insofar as it is undivided in itself, likewise it is said to be something, insofar as it is divided from others. The second mode is according to the fittingness [*convenientiam*] of one being to another; and this is not able to be except as there is something taken which by nature is fitting with every being: and this is the soul, which in a certain way is all things, as is said in *De anima* 3. For in the soul there are faculties cognitive and appetitive. Therefore

in principio Ethic. dicitur quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis: sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur secundum speciem coloris, cognoscit colorem.

Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui concordet: quae quidem concordia adaequatio intellectus et rei dicitur; et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit verum super ens, scilicet conformitatem, sive adaequationem rei et intellectus; ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei. Sic ergo entitas rei praecedat rationem veritatis, sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus.

Secundum hoc ergo veritas sive verum tripliciter invenitur diffiniri. Uno modo secundum illud quod praecedat rationem veritatis, et in quo verum fundatur; et sic Augustinus definit in Lib. Solil.: verum est id quod est; et Avicenna in sua Metaphysic.: veritas cuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei; et quidam sic: verum est indivisio esse, et quod est. Alio modo definitur secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur; et sic dicit Isaac quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus; et Anselmus in Lib. de veritate: veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis. Rectitudo enim ista secundum adaequationem quamdam dicitur, et philosophus dicit in IV Metaphysic., quod definientes verum dicimus cum dicitur esse quod est, aut non esse quod non est.

this name “good” expresses a fittingness of being to the appetite, as in the beginning of the *Ethics* it is said that “good is that which all things desire”, and the name “true” expresses the fittingness of being to the intellect. For every cognition is perfected through an assimilation of the knower to the thing known, and therefore the assimilation is said to be the cause of cognition: as sight cognizes color by being disposed itself according to the species of the color.

Therefore the first comparison of being to the intellect is insofar as being concurs with the intellect; which concordance is said to be the adaequation of the intellect and the thing; and in this is perfected the formal rationale of truth. This therefore is what “true” adds upon being, namely, conformity or adaequation of the thing and the intellect; to which conformity, as said above, follows the cognition of a thing. Therefore, thus, the being of a thing precedes the rationale of truth, but cognition is a certain effect of truth.

According to this, therefore, a threefold definition of truth and the true is found. In the first mode, it is defined according to that which precedes the intelligible rationale of truth, and in which the true is founded; and thus Augustine, in his book of *Soliloquies*, gives the definition: “the true is that which is”; and Avicenna in book eleven of his *Metaphysics* says: “The truth of any thing whatsoever is the property of its existence which establishes it as a thing”; and others say: “The true is the indivision of existence and that which is”. And in the second mode, truth is defined according to that which formally perfects the intelligible rationale of the true; and thus Isaac says that “truth is the adaequation of thing and intellect”; and Anselm in his book *On Truth* says: “Truth is rectitude perceptible by the mind alone”. For, this rectitude is said to be according to a certain adaequation, according to which the Philosopher in book four of his *Metaphysics* says, that in defining truth, we say something to be what it is, or not to be what it is not.

Tertio modo definitur verum, secundum effectum consequentem; et sic dicit Hilarius, quod verum est declarativum et manifestativum esse; et Augustinus in Lib. de vera Relig.: veritas est qua ostenditur id quod est; et in eodem libro: veritas est secundum quam de inferioribus iudicamus.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod definitio illa Augustini datur de veritate secundum quod habet fundamentum in re, et non secundum id quod ratio veri completur in adaequatione rei ad intellectum. Vel dicendum, quod cum dicitur, verum est id quod est, li est non accipitur ibi secundum quod significat actum essendi, sed secundum quod est nota intellectus componentis, prout scilicet affirmationem propositionis significat, ut sit sensus: verum est id quod est, id est cum dicitur esse de aliquo quod est, ut sic in idem redeat definitio Augustini cum definitione philosophi supra inducta.

Ad secundum patet solutio ex dictis.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquid intelligi sine altero, potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo quod intelligatur aliquid, altero non intellecto: et sic, ea quae ratione differunt, ita se habent, quod unum sine altero intelligi potest. Alio modo potest accipi aliquid intelligi sine altero, quod intelligitur eo non existente: et sic ens non potest intelligi sine vero, quia ens non potest intelligi sine hoc quod concordet vel adaequetur intellectui. Sed non tamen oportet ut quicumque intelligit rationem entis intelligat veri rationem, sicut nec quicumque intelligit ens, intelligit intellectum agentem; et tamen sine intellectu agente nihil intelligi potest.

And in the third mode, the true is defined according to the effect following [possession of the adaequation]; and thus Hilary gives the definition that “the true is that which manifests and declares existence”; and Augustine says in his book *On the Truth of Religion*: “truth is that by which that which is, is shown”; and in the same: “Truth is that according to which we judge of inferior things”.

Responses to the objections

1. To the first, that definition of Augustine is given for the true as it has its foundation in reality and not as its formal nature is given complete expression by conformity of thing and intellect. An alternative answer would be that in the statement, “The true is that which is,” the word is is not here understood as referring to the act of existing, but rather as the mark of the intellectual act of judging, signifying, that is, the affirmation of a proposition. The meaning would then be this: “The true is that which is—it is had when the existence of what is, is affirmed.” If this is its meaning, then Augustine’s definition agrees with that of the Philosopher mentioned above.

2. From the aforesaid is clear the solution to the second objection.

3. To the third it must be said “something can be understood without another” can be taken in two ways. It can mean that something can be known while another remains unknown. Taken in this way, it is true that things which differ conceptually are such that one can be understood without the other. But there is another way that a thing can be understood without another: when it is known even though the other does not exist. Taken in this sense, being cannot be known without the true, for it cannot be known unless it agrees with or conforms to intellect. It is not necessary, however, that everyone who understands the formal notion of being should also understand the formal notion of the true—just as not everyone who

understands being understands the agent intellect, even though nothing can be known without the agent intellect.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod verum est dispositio entis non quasi addens aliquam naturam, nec quasi exprimens aliquem specialem modum entis, sed aliquid quod generaliter invenitur in omni ente, quod tamen nomine entis non exprimitur; unde non oportet quod sit dispositio vel corrumpens vel diminuens vel in partem contrahens.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod dispositio non accipitur ibi secundum quod est in genere qualitatis, sed secundum quod importat quemdam ordinem; cum enim illa quae sunt causa aliorum essendi sint maxime entia, et illa quae sunt causa veritatis sint maxime vera; concludit philosophus, quod idem est ordo alicui rei in esse et veritate; ita, scilicet, quod ubi invenitur quod est maxime ens, est maxime verum. Unde nec hoc ideo est quia ens et verum ratione sunt idem, sed quia secundum hoc quod aliquid habet de entitate, secundum hoc est natum adaequari intellectui; et sic ratio veri sequitur rationem entis.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod verum et ens differunt ratione per hoc quod aliquid est in ratione veri quod non est in ratione entis; non autem ita quod aliquid sit in ratione entis quod non sit in ratione veri; unde nec per essentiam differunt, nec differentiis oppositis ab invicem distinguuntur.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod verum non est in plus quam ens; ens enim aliquo modo acceptum dicitur

4. To the fourth it must be said that truth is a disposition of being not as adding something to its nature, nor as expressing a certain special mode of being, but something which is generally found in every being, which, nevertheless, the term 'being' does not express. Consequently, it is not a disposition that corrupts, limits, or contracts.

5. To the fifth, in this objection, condition should not be understood as belonging to the genus of quality. It implies, rather, a certain order; for those which are the cause of the existence of other things are themselves beings most completely, and those which are the cause of the truth of other things are themselves true most completely. It is for this reason that the Philosopher concludes that the rank of a thing in its existence corresponds to its rank in truth, so that when one finds that which is most fully being, he finds there also that which is most fully true. But this does not mean that being and the true are the same in concept. It means simply that in the degree in which a thing has being, in that degree it is capable of being proportioned to intellect. Consequently, the true is dependent upon the formal character of being.

6. To the sixth it must be said that there is a conceptual difference between the true and being since there is something in the notion of the true that is not in the concept of the existing—not in such a way, however, that there is something in the concept of being which is not in the concept of the true. They do not differ essentially nor are they distinguished from one another by opposing differences.

7. To the seventh, the true does not have a wider extension than being. Being is, in some way, predicated of non-being

de non ente, secundum quod non ens est apprehensum ab intellectu; unde in IV Metaphys., dicit philosophus, quod negatio vel privatio entis uno modo dicitur ens; unde Avicenna etiam dicit in principio suae metaphysicae, quod non potest formari enuntiatio nisi de ente, quia oportet illud de quo propositio formatur, esse apprehensum ab intellectu; ex quo patet quod omne verum est aliquo modo ens.

Ad primum vero eorum, quae contra obiiciuntur, dicendum, quod ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens verum, quia aliquid exprimitur nomine veri quod non exprimitur nomine entis; non propter hoc quod re differant.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis istum fornicari sit malum, tamen secundum quod aliquid habet de entitate, natum est hoc conformari intellectui, et secundum hoc consequitur ibi ratio veri; et ita patet quod nec verum excedit nec exceditur ab ente.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum dicitur: diversum est esse, et quod est, distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui ille actus convenit. Nomen autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi, et ideo ratio non sequitur.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod secundum hoc verum est posterius ente, quod ratio veri differt ab entis ratione modo praedicto.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio illa deficit in tribus. Primo, quia quamvis personae divinae re distinguantur, appropriata tamen personis non differunt re, sed tantum ratione. Secundo, quia etsi

in so far as non-being is apprehended by the intellect. For, as the Philosopher says, the negation or the privation of being may, in a sense, be called being. Avicenna supports this by pointing out that one can form propositions only of beings, for that about which a proposition is formed must be apprehended by the intellect. Consequently, it is clear that everything true is being in some way.

Responses to the sed contra

1. To the first contrary, the reason why it is not tautological to call a being true is that something is expressed by the word true that is not expressed by the word being, and not that the two differ in reality.

2. To the second contrary it must be said that although fornication is evil, it possesses some being and can conform to intellect. Accordingly, the formal character of the true is found here. So it is clear that true is coextensive with being.

3. To the third contrary it must be said that, in the statement, "To be is other than that which is," the act of being is distinguished from that to which that act belongs. But the name of being is taken from the act of existence, not from that whose act it is. Hence, the argument does not follow.

4. To the fourth contrary it must be said that the true comes after being in this respect, that the notion of the true differs from that of being in the manner we have described.

5. To the fifth, it must be responded that this argument has three flaws. First, although the Persons are really distinct, the things appropriated to each Person are only conceptually, and not really, distinct. Secondly, although

personae realiter ad invicem distinguantur, non tamen realiter ab essentia distinguuntur; unde nec verum quod appropriatur personae filii, ab ente quod se tenet ex parte essentiae. Tertio, quia, etsi ens, unum, verum et bonum magis uniantur in Deo quam in rebus creatis, non tamen oportet, quod ex quo distinguuntur in Deo, quod in rebus creatis etiam distinguantur realiter. Hoc enim contingit de illis quae non habent ex ratione sua quod sint unum secundum rem, sicut sapientia et potentia, quae, cum in Deo sint unum secundum rem, in creaturis realiter distinguuntur: sed ens, unum, verum et bonum secundum rationem suam habent quod sint unum secundum rem; unde ubicumque inveniuntur, realiter unum sunt, quamvis sit perfectior unitas illius rei secundum quam uniantur in Deo, quam illius rei secundum quam uniantur in creaturis.

the Persons are really distinct from each other, they are not really distinct from the essence; so, truth appropriated to the Person of the Son is not distinct from the act of existence He possesses through the divine essence. Thirdly, although being, the true, the one, and the good are more united in God than they are in created things, it does not follow from the fact that they are conceptually distinct in God that they are really distinct in created beings. This line of argument is valid only when it is applied to things which are not by their very nature one in reality, as wisdom and power, which, although one in God, are distinct in creatures. But being, the true, the one, and the good are such that by their very nature they are one in reality. Therefore, no matter where they are found, they are really one. Their unity in God, however, is more perfect than their unity in creatures.

SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

c.61

Quod Deus est purissima veritas. That God is the purest truth.

[1] Hoc autem ostenso, manifestum est quod in Deo est pura veritas, cui nulla falsitas vel deceptio admisceri potest.

[1] It is clear from what has been shown that in God there is pure truth, with which no falsity or deception can be mingled.

[2] Veritas enim falsitatem non compatitur: sicut nec albedo nigredinem. Deus autem non solum est verus, sed est ipsa veritas. Ergo in eo falsitas esse non potest.

[2] For truth is not compatible with falsity, just as whiteness is not with blackness. God, however, is not only true, but He is the truth itself. Therefore, it is impossible that there be falsity in Him.

[3] Amplius. Intellectus non decipitur in cognoscendo quod quid est: sicut nec sensus in proprio sensibili. Omnis autem cognitio divini intellectus se habet ad modum intellectus cognoscentis quod quid est, ut ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur in divina cognitione errorem sive deceptionem aut falsitatem esse.

[3] Moreover, the intellect is not deceived in cognizing the “what” that is; just as the sense is not deceived in its proper sensible. But, as we have shown, all the cognition of the divine intellect holds itself in the manner of an intellect knowing the “what” that is. It is impossible, therefore, that there be error or deception or falsity in the divine knowledge.

[4] Praeterea. Intellectus in primis principiis non errat, sed in conclusionibus interdum, ad quas ex principiis primis ratiocinando procedit. Intellectus autem divinus non est ratiocinativus aut discursivus, ut supra ostensum est. Non igitur potest esse in ipso falsitas aut deceptio.

[4] Furthermore, the intellect does not err in the case of first principles, but it errs at times in the case of conclusions to which it proceeds by reasoning from first principles. But the divine intellect, as we have shown above, is neither ratiocinative or discursive. Therefore, there cannot be falsity or deception in it.

[5] Item. Quanto aliqua vis cognoscitiva est altior, tanto eius proprium obiectum est universalius, plura sub se continens: unde illud quod visus cognoscit per accidens, sensus communis aut imaginatio apprehendit ut sub proprio obiecto contentum. Sed vis divini intellectus est in fine sublimitatis in

[5] Again, the higher a cognoscitive power, so much the more universal is its proper object, containing more objects thereby under that power. Thus, that which sight cognitively grasps by accident, the common sense or the imagination apprehends as contained under its own proper object. But the power of the divine intellect is at the

cognoscendo. Ergo omnia cognoscibilia comparantur ad ipsum sicut cognoscibilia proprie et per se et non secundum accidens. In talibus autem virtus cognoscitiva non errat. In nullo igitur cognoscibili possibile est divinum intellectum errare.

[6] Amplius. Virtus intellectualis est quaedam perfectio intellectus in cognoscendo. Secundum autem virtutem intellectualem non contingit intellectum falsum dicere, sed semper verum: verum enim dicere est bonus actus intellectus, virtutis autem est actum bonum reddere. Sed divinus intellectus perfectior est per suam naturam quam intellectus humanus per habitum virtutis: est enim in fine perfectionis. Relinquitur igitur quod in intellectu divino non potest esse falsitas.

[7] Adhuc. Scientia intellectus humani a rebus quodammodo causatur: unde provenit quod scibilia sunt mensura scientiae humanae; ex hoc enim verum est quod intellectu diiudicatur, quia res ita se habet, et non e converso. Intellectus autem divinus per suam scientiam est causa rerum. Unde oportet quod scientia eius sit mensura rerum: sicut ars est mensura artificiatorum, quorum unumquodque in tantum perfectum est in quantum arti concordat. Talis igitur est comparatio intellectus divini ad res qualis rerum ad intellectum humanum. Falsitas autem causata ex inaequalitate intellectus humani et rei non est in rebus, sed in intellectu. Si igitur non esset omnimoda adaequatio intellectus divini ad res, falsitas esset in rebus, non in intellectu divino. Nec tamen in rebus est falsitas: quia quantum unumquodque habet de esse, tantum habet de veritate. Nulla igitur inaequalitas est inter intellectum divinum et res; nec aliqua falsitas in intellectu divino esse potest.

ultimate end of sublimity in cognizing. Therefore, all cognoscibile objects are related to it as properly cognoscibility—and through themselves and not by accident. In such cases, however, the cognoscitive power does not err. Therefore, the divine intellect cannot err in the case of any cognoscible object.

[6] Moreover, intellectual virtue is a certain perfection of the intellect in cognizing. But according to intellectual virtue the expression of falsity does not belong to an intellect, but always what is true; for to speak the true is the good of the act of the intellect, and it belongs to virtue “to make an act good.” But the divine intellect, being at the highest perfection, is more perfect through its nature than the human intellect is through the habit of virtue. It remains, therefore, that there cannot be falsity in the divine intellect.

[7] Furthermore, the knowledge of the human intellect is in a manner caused by things. Hence it is that knowable things are the measure of human knowledge; for something that is judged to be so by the intellect is true because it is so in reality, and not conversely. But the divine intellect through its knowledge is the cause of things. Hence, its knowledge is the measure of things, in the same way as an art is the measure of artifacts, each one of which is perfect in so far as it agrees with the art. The divine intellect, therefore, is related to things as things are related to the human intellect. But the falsity that is caused by the lack of equality between the human intellect and a thing is not in reality but in the intellect. If, therefore, there were no adaequation whatever of the divine intellect to things, the falsity would be found in things and not in the divine intellect. Nevertheless, there is no falsity in things, because, so far as each thing has being, to that extent does it have truth. There is, therefore, no inequality between the divine intellect and things, nor can there be any falsity in the divine intellect.

[8] Item. Sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum ipsius: naturaliter enim appetimus verum cognoscere et refugimus falso decipi. Malum autem in Deo esse non potest, ut probatum est. Non potest igitur in eo esse falsitas.

[9] Hinc est quod dicitur Rom. 3-4: est autem Deus verax; et Num. 23-19: non est Deus ut homo, ut mentiatur; et I Ioan. 1-5: Deus lux est et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae.

[8] Again, as the true is the good of the intellect, so the false is its evil. For we naturally seek to know the truth and flee from being deceived by the false. But, as we have proved, there can be no evil in God. Hence, there can be no falsity in Him.

[9] Hence it is written: "But God is true" (Rom. 3:4); and in Numbers (23:19): "God is not a man, that He should lie"; and in John (I, 1:5): "God is light, and in Him there is no darkness."