

THE PARADOXICAL STRUCTURE OF EXISTENCE

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With a new introduction by James Lehrberger



Transaction Publishers

New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.)

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This book is printed on acid-free paper that meets the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials.

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 2014040893

ISBN: 978-1-4128-5612-6

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Wilhelmsen, Frederick D., author.

The paradoxical structure of existence / Frederick D. Wilhelmsen; with a new introduction by James Lehrberger.

pages cm

Reprint of: Irving, Tex. : University of Dallas Press, 1970. Includes index.

ISBN 978-1-4128-5612-6 (acid-free paper) 1. Ontology. I. Title.

BD331.W535 2015

111'1--dc23

2014040893

If existence is radical extramentality, the act of synthesizing, and negative transcendence, it is also noncontradiction.¹² The reader will note that I have called existence non-contradiction; I have not identified existence with Aristotle's "principle of non-contradiction." Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction is the first exercised law according to which the mind functions. Things cannot be and not be simultaneously and under the same aspect. But the ground of the principle of non-contradiction is radical extramentality, or existence. Things continue being while they are. They do not cease to be in the course of their dynamic projection through time. This non-ceasing in being of all that exists is the act of being, of synthesizing. Existence is not a thing at all; but nonetheless, all the things that are continue in being; they do not cease; they persevere; perdure; are.

Existence, hence, is non-tautology. The tautological is that which repeats itself, that which bends back itself and is expressible in the proposition, "A is A." In order to form a tautological statement, we need a Platonic form, a "sameness" or an "*ensimismidad*" in Orgeta's language. The tautological is presence two times over. Tautology is possible because the mind, after a pause or a change of attention, can bend back upon the *already* given, thus judging "A (it was *already* there!) is A." But existence is not a given or an "it" upon which the mind can return at its leisure. Were we to seek an image for existence, a symbol, we might think of the wind as it pushes along a tiny ship of sails. The wind is not where it was and it cannot be seen, but the ship sails merrily on. Or we might think of the Spirit that fills all things but that is not one of them at all.

B. The Paradoxical Structure of Existence

St. Thomas's revolution in metaphysics cannot be said to have been understood clearly in his own day. Shortly after his death, Giles of Rome wrote something of a commentary upon the Thomistic distinction between essence and existence.¹³ Giles made popular the formula, "real distinction" which was rarely employed by Aquinas himself. According to Giles, "real distinction" means that essence and existence are distinct the way in which two things are distinct. Giles failed to note that his master had already reduced the meaning of "thing," *res*, to essence or nature. But the formula, a "real distinction between essence and existence," suggests, without insisting, that the two principles are distinguished the way in which two things are distinguished from one another.

Suarez, in the sixteenth century, denied this real distinction on the following grounds.¹⁴ If essence and existence are distinct as things, existence must *be* something and essence must *be* something. But this is a blatant contradiction because an essence which already *is* something needs no new existence. We might add to the Suarezian attack the following consideration concerning existence. If existence is distinct from essence as is one thing from another, then existence is “in itself.” But an existence that is really “in itself” is either an abstraction in the mind, altogether without content and therefore nothing (Hegel), or will somehow be identified with God. Suarez personally returned to an Aristotelianism, identifying being and nature.

For our purposes here it suffices to note that the Suarezians are perfectly right in their attack against the Thomistic formula, if that formula be interpreted as Giles interpreted it. Giles’ problem consisted in his having frozen the distinction into the conceptual order whereas in truth it cannot be conceived at all. Existence, as emphasized throughout this study, is *not* “the real.” The real is this world in which we live, a world made up of things present to one another and to the human intelligence and sensibility. Existence is the “be-ing” of that world, in no sense a “presence,” but an act known only in being affirmed in judgment.

The issue will become more cogent if we attend to what we shall call here “the paradoxical structure of existence.” A paradox, understood in the proper Chestertonian sense of the term, is the tension existing *between two* apparently opposed propositions which cross one another and thus find themselves at peace. If this tension is dissolved, the paradox gives way to a dialectic which can be defined, following Hegel, as the resolution of contradictions into a higher unity. Dialectic, therefore, is the enemy of paradox because dialectic cannot stand the co-existence of tension either in the world or in the mind or in the moral order. The metaphysics of being, as shall be indicated, is either dialectical or paradoxical. If dialectical, then Hegelian; if paradoxical, then—if not precisely “Thomistic”—certainly Chestertonian.

The most striking paradox about the act of existing is that it neither is nor is not. If the existence of a tree existed we would have to conclude that the tree did not exist. If the “to be” of a tree doubled back upon itself and affirmed itself, then the tree would drop into nothingness. But this contradicts our experience of reality. What is evident to us is that the tree is being. The “to be” of the tree does not subsist or exist in itself. Existence is totally of the thing that is, a concrete reality that unfolds and develops through time. It follows that existential activity

as such can neither be affirmed nor denied. This activity cannot be denied because such a denial would deny that the thing is. A sign of this is the truth that the thing continues be-ing as long as it is. Because existence is beyond affirmation and beyond negation, existence is negative transcendence.

Both affirmation and negation belong to the order of judgment. I affirm "x" to be, or I deny that "x" is. Judgment thus bears, at least initially, upon an object or a presence. Affirmation looks to the existent. Since "to be" has already been declared non-identical with the essence, it follows that "to be" is neither the given nor the objective nor the present. Not only does our Chestertonian reasoning move us beyond the Suarezian critique, but it also pushes us beyond the metaphysics of modernity which have their roots in the Hegelian dialectic.

A dialectical metaphysics (and theology, we might add) sees radical extramentality as following the dialectical pattern of the human intelligence which says "yes" and "no" to the objects which cross its intentional screen. For Friedrich Georg Hegel, being is an object. This object is absolutely undetermined, unspecified in that it formally includes neither your being nor mine, nor the being of any concrete thing whatsoever. It is being "which is in our presence."¹⁵ The words are Hegel's. This being is his "absolutely empty" which in turn is identified with the pure act of thinking. When I think a tree, there is a distinction between the object thought and my thinking it. But when I think being as vacant presence, I encounter pure identity between being and thinking, the real, and the ideal. There is no distinction whatsoever between a thinking which is undetermined and an object which is undetermined. Being and Being-thought are identical. The absolute vacancy and lack of specificity of Being bespeak Being's identity with Non-Being. Since all beings are concrete and since Being is not, it follows that Being is formally its own contradiction. This "yes" and "no" involved in being and in being's "being-thought" begins the dialectic, and through the dialectic, everything in heaven and on earth is understood. The thesis "Being" is opposed by the antithesis "Non-Being," and both are transcended by their synthesis, "Becoming." Contradictions clash and are then transcended in a synthesis which converts itself into a new thesis, itself destined to encounter its antithesis. The synthesis transcends the oppositions found between the thesis and the antithesis; it annuls the contradiction; it reconciles the conflict.

Hegel worked the whole of his philosophy out of the cloth of the dialectic. A few instances suffice to reveal his method. In the political

order, the thesis is the family which stands for community; the antithesis is the isolated individual who leaves the family, loses community, but gains liberty; the synthesis is the State which achieves a higher liberty and community by transcending, annulling, and reconciling family and individual. Let us take an instance from contemporary dialectical Protestant theology as represented by Paul Tillich.¹⁶ The Father is the thesis; given that the thesis is empty, the Father engenders His opposite, the concretion of the Son; the Holy Spirit is the reconciliation of the contradiction *and the breaking of the tension*.

Everything is true and everything is false within a dialectical philosophy. Systems are true within their moment within the dialectic: Plato was true for his time, Aristotle for his. Civilizational affirmations are all true within the dialectic: for example, the Middle Ages with reference to Classical Antiquity. Systems and Civilizations and men become false only when they refuse to play the dialectical game, only when they stand outside the dialectic. They are “moments of abstraction,” reactionary backwaters that have refused to enter the dialectical stream of history. They merit death in the name of History.

Hegelians conceive the end of history in diverse ways. Marxian Hegelianism sees it as a classless society. Secular humanist Hegelianism (e.g., Harvey Cox and Company) sees it as a “Secular City” totally purged of the sacral. Evolutionary Hegelianism (e.g., Teilhard de Chardin) sees it as an “Omega Point” in which matter will have merged into consciousness. Hegel himself saw history’s end as the Absolute Spirit, a new *identity* of spirit and reality which would not be empty as is Being and Thought, but totally full—absolute concretion and absolute universality, total reconciliation. In any event, Hegel’s dialectical method dominates the modern consciousness and has properly been called “the Perpetual Revolution” because every given moment in time and every doctrinal and civilizational posture is destined to be contradicted and transcended by its own antithesis.

The dialectics of the Perpetual Revolution are based upon the possibility of objectifying being and then contradicting it. If Being were an object or a presence, then Hegel and his followers—be they Marxists or evolutionists or whatsoever—would be substantially correct in their basic philosophical outlook and in the practical political action that results therefrom. However, if being—understood as radically extramental activity, as non-contradiction, as existence—transcends both affirmation and negation, it follows that metaphysics can never be dialectical. By “separating” being from nature, the philosopher has gone beyond any possibility of saying either “yes” or “no” to existence.

Hegel, of course, was not the first philosopher to discover the concept of an absolutely empty being. This was known by the classical and Christian tradition as the logician's concept of being, opposed to what the tradition called—somewhat inaccurately, in our view—the metaphysician's "concept" of being. The logician's "being" is actually the last residue of a long series of abstractions which begin with a concrete thing, let us say a man, and which proceed to his specific essence, humanity, then to his generic essence, animality, and on back—through living substance to substance—until simply "being" is reached. This concept or idea of being possesses the greatest extension because it "covers" everything, but it is the most impoverished in meaning or comprehension because it says "nothing" at all about everything that is. If this last residue of the abstractive power of the human mind is taken to be Being in radical extramentality through the legerdemain of identifying thought and reality, then Being contradicts itself and the dialectic begins. Actually, however, the logician—in order to reach his concept of being—is constantly moving away from existing things and hence from their "to be." The essential determinations of being which he strips from his idea of "being" themselves *are being*. It follows that *his* "being" truly is nonbeing.

Paradoxical metaphysics, however, is Trans-Revolutionary in that it transcends rather than simply counters (which would be to fall into the dialectic) the Hegelian system. No Christian philosopher ought ever to enter into a "dialogue" with Marxists such as Garaudy, because the very dialogue is situated within a dialectic which forces the Christian, willy-nilly, along a road ending in the murder of his own God. A dialogue which is dialectical is the death of metaphysics. This returns us to what was said about paradox. Both dialectic and paradox are concerned with tension. A dialectic resolves tension by contradicting the oppositions found in opposites and by seeking a higher unity. A dialectical thinker is obsessed by tension, but he cannot stand to live within it. This is true of all orders of the real. Paradox, however, achieves a tension *and then maintains it!* The refusal to either affirm or deny existential activity and the willingness to reason, to philosophize, *within the tension* produces the paradoxical situation of metaphysics.

The issue is further elucidated if we turn to Plato's teaching on The Same and The Other. If Hegel was a great master of the problem of Identity, Plato was master of The Same. For Plato, Being is that which is the *same as itself*. A tree is Being just so long as it remains *the same*

as it was. Suarez, in commenting upon Aquinas' "real distinction," understood as Giles of Rome understood it, might well have argued as follows: you Thomists teach that "to be" is really other than essence; therefore, you ought to express your convictions in terms of The Same and The Other; you ought to maintain that Being or Existence is simply "the otherness" of essence. Had Suarez said this, he would have been reinforced by what Karl Barth and other Protestant theologians have said in our time, following Luther. God, for them, "is the Totally Other"; He is completely separate from the complexity making up the world.

But essence or nature is not distinct from existence the way in which The Same is distinct from The Other. The act of existing bypasses both Sameness and Otherness. The historical locus for our insistence on this point is Thomas' teaching on the so-called "transcendental attributes" of being. In his discussion of these "transcendental attributes," the Common Doctor discovered a pseudo-attribute of being, *aliquid*, or "something."¹⁷ We can predicate of everything that it is "something." But *aliquid* is only a logical transcendental at best. "Something" is a concept which arises in the mind as a result of a double negation effected by the human intellect in judgment. An object presents itself to my mind, through my sensibility. My mind shifts its attention and then returns back upon the *same* object: it is not *other than itself*. The category of The Same and its opposite, The Other, are the consequences of this return of the mind upon an object. Sameness and Otherness are not metaphysical principles at all! Better yet: they have nothing to do with radical extramentality but are, rather, mental constructs which we fashion necessarily in order to deal with reality as present to the mind. Things, we say, are the same as themselves because they are not some other things. But this last is not extramental. Given that "to be" as radical extramentality is not-identically essence, *it follows that existence is neither the same as essence nor other than essence*. Existence transcends both poles of what is actually merely a conceptual opposition.

The business can be expressed epistemologically in the following fashion. The Thomistic tradition is broadly agreed that the act of knowing is an intentional assimilation of the known to the knower: *scire est esse aliud inquantum aliud*. But the reality absorbed by the knower—living thus a new life, that of the knower—is the thing itself in all its essentiality stripped—in intellectual knowledge—of the material conditions surrounding its material existence. But the *esse* of the thing known cannot be intentionally absorbed. Such a metaphysical nightmare would involve the knower's becoming the known physically

or the thing known becoming physically the knower. The *esse* of the known is not absorbed. It is *affirmed*. This is the very fundamental datum of knowledge as an intending act. I intend the known, understand the known, as being independent of my act of knowing it. The knowing act, thus, is thoroughly relational and the term of that relation is the existing thing. It follows that knowledge does not precisely absorb existence: it absorbs the existent. The *esse* of the existent, never an object capable of being absorbed cognitively, is not affirmed to exist itself. Were *esse* an object in a world of objects, *esse* could be affirmed or denied. Since *esse* is neither, it is known not precisely as an “itself” which *esse* is not but as the ground of that which is, that without which there would be nothing to affirm. Direct realism—which is sanity—affirms that things are but no realist could ever affirm that existence exists, unless—of course—he were talking about God. The *esse* is not the *esse* of the relational and intentional act which is knowledge: the *esse* is the term of the relational act, neither “the same” as itself nor “other than itself.” This term is known, of course, in the full reflection that the intellect exercises upon its own knowing.¹⁸ This last consideration, however, pertains more to the theory of knowledge, to epistemology, and here we simply note it. Given that existence is neither The Same nor The Other, existence is neither Transcendence nor Immanence. The issue demands elucidation.

A cluster of philosophers and theologians today who have raised the concepts of Transcendence and Immanence into metaphysical principles. They contrast an immanent world with a transcendent God. The Greeks, so goes the typical reasoning employed by these thinkers, lived within a world so utterly immanent to itself that its very gods were nothing other than intrinsic principles of order. But the Christian world cracked the boundaries of immanence and achieved an understanding of a Transcendent God utterly *other than* the world. The argument is suspicious because if God were “Totally Other” we could not know it anyhow! Metaphysically, Transcendence is the purity of Otherness whereas Immanence is the purity of Sameness. The terms simply radicalize “The Same” and “The Other.” But both terms mutually define one another. Transcendence makes sense in terms of Immanence and Immanence in terms of Transcendence. The opposition which is pushed between the two concepts is done by men who do not wish to mingle the Christian God with the World. Actually, however, their reasoning tends to contradict their intentions. Since Transcendence and Immanence are mutually defining intelligibilities, a Transcendent

God would be defined in terms of *His Other*, creation. Both creation and the Creator would be fixed under a common genus—which bifurcated into Transcendence and Immanence. God would thus be measured by what He is not, creation. It follows that Immanence and Transcendence are not ultimately metaphysical, any more than are any pair of mutually opposed concepts. In a word, God is neither immanence nor transcendence because He is no more The Same nor The Other than is existence itself. The theology of transcendence is more a psychology of how we come to know God rather than a statement about the metaphysical order. Transcendence and Immanence make sense in terms of processes that go on inside human experience. I transcend affirmatively in faith by annealing myself to the God of Revelation through grace, and I transcend negatively in metaphysics by denying that *esse* is nature.

Existence is articulated not in terms of nature's "otherness," but in terms of non-identity. *Esse*, neither the same nor the other, is non-identity. This bypasses Hegel's insistence that the Real (Spirit) is ultimately Absolute Identity. It also bypasses Plato's understanding of Identity. Plato's identity is expressed in the proposition, "x is x." The locus of Platonic identity is the human mind doubling back upon an object, an "idea." What Plato called "Identity" is only Sameness.

The issue can be clarified by noting that identity is not contradicted by diversity but rather by non-identity. If identity were contradicted by diversity, the non-identity of a thing with its own *esse* would imply its diversity from that very existence. Any other position would have to argue that the metaphysical situation discovered between essence and existence was equivalent to that found between one being and another. This is evidently false because: (1) it would imply the "thingification" of essence and existence; (2) it would bespeak an absolute separation between essence and existence because the existential diversity between any pair of beings is absolute and not relative: absolutely speaking, no one thing *is* anything else.

The problem at hand is rooted fundamentally in a confusion between the dialectic (taken in the Platonic sense) of The Same and The Other and the non-identity of existence and essence. Plato, speaking of The Same and The Other in the *Parmenides*, demonstrated that they can be both identical and non-identical: the same man is identically himself and simultaneously non-identical with a tree; the *other* tree is identical with itself and non-identical with the same man. Identity and non-identity move within an order which transcends the dialectic of the

Same and the Other. The non-identity of the act of being with essence implies no existential “otherness” between *esse* and *id quod est*. By the same token, it implies no existential “sameness.” Given that the act of existing does not exist or subsist, existential identity and non-identity cannot be converted into the dialectic of Sameness and Otherness. It follows that non-being cannot be inserted into being as though it were being’s “other.” (The issue is explored fully in the next chapter.) Non-being could enter the field of being only if existence existed.

The above reinforces the paradoxical and non-dialectical character of metaphysics. The interjection of non-being into being (Hegel and his followers) would involve being’s becoming a “something.” Being would have to identify itself with itself. This is impossible, *pace* Hegel, because being or existential activity is not a being or object or thing in any substantive sense; being is not even a vacant object. Hegelian non-being, as the dialectical opposition to being, would be intelligible only if being were a vacant indeterminate object, a “something” identically one with that thought which thinks it. Philosophers can fool themselves by converting existence into an object (a “something” thought) capable of being opposed by its opposite or its negation: the proposition “existence is existence” or “being is being” dialectically permits (and even demands, because of its indetermination) its counterpart, “existence is not existence.” Paradoxical metaphysics transcends the horns of this dilemma: given that existence is neither affirmable nor deniable, existence cannot contradict itself: as demonstrated, existence is non-contradiction.

The metaphysical non-identity of existence and nature is an extremely radical truth. As demonstrated, nature is nothing outside of being, even though being (*esse*) forms no part of essence. Each essence is identically itself: Man, horse, tree. Since no essence is identically being or existence, it follows that by essence all things are nothing. Existentially expressed in the light of identity, nature is zero. By nature, things are non-being. We are all so many nothings made to be. But although we are made to exist, existence takes no root in us. Existence does not settle into nature the way in which seeds settle into plowed earth where they grow and become part of a field. My being is perpetually held on suffrance. I am not identically existence. This truth is hammered home to a man when he faces the ultimate danger, death. But this does not mean that my *esse* is somehow “other” than I: my being is neither the “same” as nor “other” than myself; my being continues to be mine, but it is I who continue to exist.

This is the meaning of the formula, “essence is not identically existence.” This formula is truly paradoxical because “not to be existence” does not mean “not to be,” but rather “to be in this or that fashion.” Whereas the style of nature is nature (formal identity): for example, a man’s style of dancing is his dancing, the style of being is not Being: the dancing is not its own being.

All of this can be grasped fully, however, only if we are capable of systematically exorcising the spectre of the Nothing which haunts European philosophy.

Notes

1. Ortega y Gasset, *José, Historia como sistema*, 4 ed. en castellano, Revista de Occidente, 1958, *passim*; McLuhan, Marshall, *The Gutenberg Galaxy*, University of Toronto Press, 1st. U.S. ed., 1965. McLuhan’s brilliant penetration of the role of the human sensorium in culture is a rich phenomenological field for the future progress of metaphysics.
2. Heidegger, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–80, 146, 156, 161, 205–6.
3. This understanding of essence was first suggested, to our knowledge, by: Ferrer Arellano, Joaquin, *Filosofia de las relaciones juridicas*, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, Spain, 1963.
4. Juenger, Friedrich, *The Failure of Technology*, Regnery, Chicago, 1949 (cf. as well, our introduction).
5. The meaning of “*excessus*” in St. Thomas has not been elaborated fully as yet by contemporary scholarship. The term generally appears when Aquinas is commenting upon some Platonic text. The richest source for the “*excessus*” is Aquinas’ *In de divinis nominibus*, c. V. St. Thomas speaks of a double relation to be found in created *esse*: *esse* as related terminally to form or essence and *esse* seen as caused, as a “towards God.” This second consideration is an “*excessus*” whereas the first is not (*Ibid.*, *o.c.* and *cap. cit.*). *Esse* seen in the composite, in *ens*, is simply the act of being of the thing; but *esse* understood as related to God is a “plus,” in no sense reducible to its role as actualizing an *ens*. Cf. our discussion of these texts in: Wilhelmsen, Frederick D., *El problema de la transcendencia en la metafísica actual*, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–43.
6. *De Veritate*, I, 1.
7. “It will easily be observed that this action is originally one and is equipollent for all combination, and that its dissolution, namely, *analysis*, which appears to be its opposite, yet always presupposes it. For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot dissolve, since only as having been combined by the understanding can anything that allows of analysis be given to the faculty of representation.” Kant, I., *Critique of Pure Reason*, B. 130, tr. Norman Kemp Smith; *Ibid.*, B. 134, note; Kant, *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, 9 (43).
8. Hume, David, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. G.A. Selby Bigge, Oxford, 1896, pp. 634–646.
9. Hegel, Friedrich G., *Science of Logic*, Johnston-Struthers, I, 81, 94–120; *Encyclopaedia Logic*, 86–88 (Wallace, 156–9).

10. The literature of analogy in St. Thomas is enormous. We mention here as an introduction the work of Phelan, Gerald: *St. Thomas and Analogy*, The Aquinas Lecture, 1941, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1942; the classic statement on the famous “analogy of proper proportionality” remains that of Cajetan: *De Nominum Analogia, editionem curavit P.N. Zammit, O.P.*, Romae apud Institutum Angelicum, 1934. Dr. Marshall McLuhan has noted that “the Thomistic notion of the simultaneous interplay among the senses is as unvisionalizable as analogical proportionality” (McLuhan, *Ibid.*, p. 11). Analogical proportionality—the relation between *esse* and essence which is absolutely distinct in all things and only proportionately one—bears upon *esse*’s absence, its failure to “present itself” before the screen of consciousness. Given that “presence” is an emergence of the real, a “togethering” in the logos in Hellenic terms, presence is the stiffening of things into completed reality. Presence is univocity when conceptualized, rendered abstract. It follows that a linear or horizontal comparison of things escapes the “in depth” dimension of the act of existence. Essences can be “compared” with one another and individual instances of essence can be “measured” in the degree to which they conform to the standard. Beings, however, can only “be compared” with themselves: with their “living up” existentially to meanings inscribed within *esse*. In a Thomistic universe, differences are far more profound than equalities or inequalities. This last, however, is incomprehensible to the Cartesian rationalism within which the West has lived now for some four centuries and which is dying only today. As an instance of these implications in the political order we might mention the debate today being carried out by political philosophers concerning the ultimate meaning of America’s historical experience: is America dedicated to equality or is America not? The very question is incomprehensible within cultures annealed in the analogical salt of being due to the emphasis given differences: two carpenters are *equal* or *unequal* to one another *qua* carpenters, but a carpenter and a plumber are simply different. In this regard, from this angle, they can only be compared in the following way: is the carpenter as good *qua* carpenter as is the plumber *qua* plumber? The “yes” or “no” given this question is not given in terms of equality or inequality. In a word: these latter, being univocal, function within a broader existential order precisely as essence functions within being.

The theoretical confusion concerning the meaning of “presence” by the Western philosophical tradition is illustrated by: (a) Leslie Dewart’s reduction of God to a mere presence in the name of “de-hellenizing” Catholic doctrine (Dewart, Leslie, *The Future of Belief*, *op. cit.*); (b) Heidegger’s insistence that being for the pre-Socratic Greeks means nothing other than—presence itself; (c) Voegelin’s contention that Heidegger’s reduction of hellenic being to presence is an instance of the gnostic “Murder of God” in that Being is not but emerges from out of the past into the future, thus eliminating the need for the Creator (Voegelin, Eric, *Science, Politics and Gnosticism*, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1968 pp. 46–48). There might be a certain convergence of Voegelin’s understanding of defined Christian doctrine and Dewart’s. Both are very suspicious of conceptual articulation, and Voegelin tends to restrict Christianity to the “initial experience” of the apostles. (Voegelin, “Immortality: Experience and Symbol,” *Harvard*

Theological Review, July, 1967, Vol. 60, No. 3) It remains true, however, that “presence” means “nature” as “unfolded” as opposed to being in the verbal sense of *esse*. We are in agreement, roughly at least, with Heidegger’s phenomenology of nature, but depart totally from his metaphysics.

11. Wilhelmsen, Frederick D., *op. cit.*
12. This was first suggested by: Polo, Leonardo, *El acceso al ser*, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, Spain, 1963.
13. Cf. Suarez’ discussion of the position of Giles: *Metaphysicae disputationes, disp.*, XXXI. 1,3, p. 1150.
14. Suarez, *Ibid.*
15. Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
16. Tillich, Paul, *Systematic Theology*, University of Chicago Press, 1957, Vol. II, pp. 143–4, 226–230, 251.
17. *De Veritate*, I, 1.
18. The intellect, in reflecting upon itself in act (a privilege of spirit where parts-outside-of-parts play no role) knows its own knowing. This knowing of itself in exercised act is simultaneously a measuring of its own relatedness to the real. Every act of knowing is an intentional absorbing of the known to the knower, an intentional identity, an act in which the intelligence, cognizing itself cognizing, knows that what it has become has being, existence, in the real (cf., Wilhelmsen, Frederick D., *Man’s Knowledge of Reality*, pp. 134–156, Preserving Christian Publications, Albany, NY, 1988).