A Philosophical Happy Hour on the distinctions between falsehood, lies, and deception, and the morality of their use

“Is lying always wrong?  Is lying always lying?” There are two ways, I believe, that we can approach this question.  The first evaluates manuals of moral theology or commentaries on ethics, looking for foundational reasons why for whatever answer is given.  Though this endeavor is important, it tends to find itself embroiled in countless particulars of examples, counter-examples, and those foundational reasons become obscured.

The second approach takes us along, instead, a semiotic trajectory: that is, one that attempts understanding all manner of deviation from the truth in terms of the signs by which such relations are constituted.  While this post intends only to raise some questions for our Happy Hour, it will nevertheless attempt to illuminate this semiotic trajectory.

Distinguishing Falsehoods

We have all likely heard the words “lie”, “lying”, and “liar” from a very early age—most having been accused of wearing burning pants no later than kindergarten, I suspect.  But how are lies introduced to us first?  What is the first lie you remember—one you were told, or one you told yourself?  Were you conscious of it being a lie?  Perhaps not precisely.  But, no doubt, you knew it was not the truth.

We discern very early on, in other words, that lies may help us avoid pains or gain pleasures.  But at what point do we recognize them for lies?  That is, knowing that they are not truths is not precisely the same thing as knowing that they are lies; or is knowing the absence—falsehood—the same thing as knowing the positive opposite—the lie?  What kind of difference is there between a lie and a deception?

Faculties of Lying and Deception

One of the most common principled arguments against the use of lies is named the “perverted faculty” argument: in short, that our faculty for communicating is essentially ordered towards the communication of the truth, and the intentional deviation from that purpose constitutes a perversion.

But is this perversion specifically restricted to lies or does it extend to other forms of deception?  Can one willfully deceive where telling the truth would render great harm to oneself or another?

Perhaps we can take up this question in another way.  If the faculties of communication exist for the sake of truth, what kinds of deceptions depart from that purpose?  Do fictional stories?  Myths and legends in which we allow children to believe—like Santa Claus?  What of communicating from behind an anonymous digital avatar and screen name?  Does this, too, constitute a certain deception—and is it legitimate or not?

The Semiotics of Falsity

Please join us this Wednesday (28 August 2024) for our Philosophical Happy Hour (5:45–7:15pm ET; latecomers and anonymous listeners welcome!) as we try to discover the truth about lying.