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On Listening

What immediate irony!  Reading about listening.  Indeed, we all tend to do far more reading, I suspect, than we do listening.  That often we read poorly does not take away from the fact that we read continually.  For a great many of us, the nature of work, study, and even distraction often involves a discernment of visual signs, and for most of that “great many”, the visual signs are written words.  We live primarily through our eyes—evidenced, even by the very fact of your reading this, and my announcing it to you in the written word, rather than my speaking and your listening.  As Aristotle writes in his Metaphysics, “even if we are not going to do anything else, we prefer, as one might say, seeing to the other sensations.” (980a 25-26).  He adds that sight, more so than the other senses, makes know “in the highest degree and makes clear many differences in things.”

But though sight truly is a wonderful gift, it may in a world of endless stimuli be greedily indulged.  We may see countless things, at truly mind-numbing speed.  In the words of Cardinal Sarah, “Images are drugs that we can no longer do without, because they are present everywhere and at every moment.”[1]  Rapacious addiction to visual novelty degrades our vision itself.

Simultaneously, I believe, it has atrophied our capacity for listening.

What is Listening?

Perhaps because we have adopted poor, mechanical metaphors, I believe we often misunderstand our senses: we tend to think of them as sensing or not; as “on” or “off”.  A little reflection, however, shows that our senses are, in fact, always active, so long as the organs are intact.  Right now, doubtless, you are touching several objects: clothing, the floor, your chair, your phone—and even if you were somehow to be suspended, floating naked in midair, you’d still be in contact with that air itself, even if the ambient temperature is so perfectly attuned to your own that you cannot detect it.  So too, you may shut your eyes, but even then, you have succeeded only in removing the object, light; you have not “turned off” the sense.

Hearing, too, is always present.  So common, in fact, are the ubiquitous noises of our world today that we remark mostly on their absence—“it’s so [too] quiet in here”.  But even in the quietest of rooms, in the quietest of homes, on the most noiseless property in all the world, one is very likely to hear something; even if naught else but one’s own breathing.  The volume of small noises (inhale-exhale; a ticking watch; a light breeze) grows conspicuous against the lack of anything louder.  It was just this point—the omnipresence of sound—that motivated John Cage’s (in)famous piece of “music”, 4’33”, during which a pianist sits at his piano and plays not a single note.  In the absence of music, one hears countless other sounds: creaks of chairs, rustling of clothes, passing vehicles, gusts of wind, yelling on the street—and so on.  We hear such things all the time.  Many, Cage included, have interpreted this to mean there is no such thing as silence.

Just as images have become drugs without which we cannot do, so too, for many, has sound: endlessly filling one’s ears with music as naught but background, or the dialogue of a television show, or a podcast, or anything which might keep our minds from roaming too far from whatever menial tasks we have before us.[2]  Oftener than not, such blasé auditory stimulation, rather than informing our minds of meaningful distinctions, provides us only an uncritical emotional response.  We listen to music to get into (or out of) moods.  The television show comforts us with its familiarity and lack of personal threat.  The podcast alleviates the boredom of a humdrum daily task.

That is, we do not listen because we do not attend to the objects signified through sound but acknowledge (or ignore) them only as received into (or rejected by) our own egotistical subjectivity.  And this egotism, I believe, reflects the noise of our own hearts and minds more than the ambient sounds of our environments.

Silence and Music

“Uncontrollable rivers flow through the heart,” says Cardinal Sarah, “and it is all a man can do to find interior silence.”[3]  We might believe these auditory stimuli, which “speak to us”, to calm the uncontrollable rivers.  In truth, they are naught but anesthetics, numbing us to the torrent.  We drown our ears and flood our hearts with noise: “Noise,” writes C.S. Lewis’ Screwtape, “the grand dynamism, the audible expression of all that is exultant, ruthless, and virile—Noise which alone defends us from silly qualms, despairing scruples and impossible desires.  We will make the whole universe a noise in the end.  We have already made great stride in this direction as regards the Earth.”[4]

Conversely, truly listening to anything requires that we first attain silence.  Indeed, the necessity of silence grows the more abundant noise has become.  In the words of Pope Benedict XVI:[5]

Silence is an integral element of communication; in its absence, words rich in content cannot exist… When messages and information are plentiful, silence becomes essential if we are to distinguish what is important from what is insignificant or secondary.  Deeper reflection helps us to discover the links between events that at first sight seem unconnected, to make evaluations, to analyze messages; this makes it possible to share thoughtful and relevant opinions, giving rise to an authentic body of shared knowledge.  For this to happen, it is necessary to develop an appropriate environment, a kind of ‘eco-system’ that maintains a just equilibrium between silence, words, images, and sounds.

How do we develop and maintain this “equilibrium”—that interior silence?  The corollary to the peace of silence is the joy of music—true music, that is, heard not as background but to which we listen and in which we move beyond and outside ourselves into something more.  It is a Scholastic adage that nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu: nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses.  Perhaps that our hearts have music and silence, we need first to unblock our ears.

Recovering the Art of Listening

That is, listening is a kind of work, an art, and one that we have lost.  We lack the cognitive endurance today, it seems, for the art of truly listening—as Christopher Blum and Joshua Hochschild note in their Mind at Peace: “The eye can take in a vast scene almost at once, but one must have patience to receive the fullness of a song or of a speech.”[6]  What then are the practical steps that we can take to recover this art?

I would challenge you all, before attending our Philosophical Happy Hour this Wednesday (1 May 2024) to listen to something—a symphony, an album, a lengthy speech—without other distraction.  Do naught but listen.  What do you find in the experience?  How did you attend differently to the songs or sounds, the words or thoughts?  What merit do you see in this focused listening?

Philosophical Happy Hour

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Come join us for drinks (adult or otherwise) and a meaningful conversation. Open to the public! Held every Wednesday from 5:45–7:15pm ET.



[1] 2016: The Power of Silence: Against the Dictatorship of Noise, §46.

[2] This accusation is not meant to be strictly universal, but to help us recognize a trend, whether one present in ourselves or those we know.

[3] 2016: Power of Silence, §48.

[4] 1942: Screwtape Letters, 120 (Letter 23).

[5] 20 May 2012: “Silence and Word: Path of Evangelization”.  The whole message is worth contemplation.

[6] 2017: A Mind at Peace: Reclaiming an Ordered Soul in the Age of Distraction, 72.

The Thomistic Concept of Truth

The Lyceum Institute will be co-hosting an inaugural X.com (formerly Twitter) Space, this Thursday (25 April 2024) at 2pm ET, with @Aquinas_Quotes. We will be discussing the Thomistic Concept of Truth. Anyone with an account can listen in! Link below. To facilitate our discussion, we will be considering Thomas Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles, 1.61 and De veritate, q.1, a.1, as well as an excerpt from Josef Pieper.

Here is a PDF of the two texts from St. Thomas. Texts from Pieper are attached below.

Science and Philosophy: In Dialogue?

Positivism and Science

A difficult and complex question in philosophy today concerns the discussion regarding the intersection and “boundaries” of the harder empirical sciences and the distinct activity of philosophical enquiry.  Given the success of scientific discovery, one temptation in the early 20th century was to claim that disciplines such as biology, chemistry, physics, and the like were (or would eventually become) exhaustive for understanding the world and nature.  This position, known as “positivism”, claimed that genuine inquiry into the world of nature either had to be reducible to empirical testing and measuring or was known to be true tautologically.[1]  Anything that did not conform to these modes of inquiry, such as classical metaphysics and theology, were considered pseudo-scientific in their mode of enquiry.  

Standing in contrast to this reductive position, the French Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain argues in his Degrees of Knowledge that a bifurcation can be made between sciences as affirmative, to which he ascribes the empirical “hard” sciences and studies, and the more deductive science of proper “explication” or knowledge of and from first principles:[2]

Briefly, we can say that science in general deals with the necessities immanent in natures, with the universal essences realized in individuals in the concrete and sensible world.  The distinction has been drawn between the explicatory or deductive sciences, which attain to these natures by discovery (constructively in mathematics, and from without to what is within in the case of philosophy), and the affirmative or inductive sciences, which only attain these natures as signs and substitutes, blindly so to say.  These latter have assuredly a certain explicative value, without which they would not be sciences, but which consists in indicating the necessities of things by way of sensible experiment, not by assigning their intelligible reasons.

Maritain’s distinction between the two sciences of the “explicatory” and the “affirmative” does not distinguish entities as they exist in the world, but rather between different ways of grasping entities in the world.  It is this distinction that forms the basis of Maritain’s own investigation and his defense against positivism: namely, the three degrees of abstraction (by which we attain the natures of physical objects, mathematical objects, and metaphysical objects).  Even so, if all Maritain has done here is provide room for a study of metaphysics or a natural philosophy based upon principles, there remains the question as to how the two modes of enquiry interact with one another—if at all.  Are the affirmative sciences corrective of the explicatory?  Do the explicatory sciences have their own interpretive autonomy in relation to what can be measured and analyzed empirically?

The Cenoscopic and Idioscopic

Another distinction made in philosophy, taken first from Jeremy Bentham, but developed by C. S. Peirce is the distinction between cenoscopic and idioscopic sciences. The cenoscopic sciences are characterized by their study of what is common among the many and divergent, and the idioscopic is characterized by the specializing or the breaking apart of inquiry:[3]

In cenoscopy, things escape the eye not by being hidden by virtue of their tininess or hugeness, or their extension over eons of time or involvement in hyper-complexities of culture, but simply by their commonness. Their very obviousness requires a conscious direction of our attention, like that needed to notice the ticking of a clock that your ears were hearing all the while you conversed with someone, but which remained unperceived because you were otherwise occupied…The “idioscopic,” by contrast, is a “look” that is idios – “singular, special(ized)” – and that began to be cultivated in earnest only in modern times. It has become the very glory of modern science, and has brought countless blessings and maledictions into our contemporary biosphere.

Whereas cenoscopy offers us a “grand theory of everything” and seeks to unite the divergent modes of enquiry, idioscopic enquiry by its nature seeks to break apart, to isolate, to experiment upon, and to measure.  Neither science is necessarily wrongheaded in what it seeks to inquire, but both are deficient with regards to understanding the world and how we relate to it:[4]

In summary, these four areas of human knowing – the astronomically big and the microscopically small, the biologically compounded and the culturally complex – invite idioscopic science to don its instruments, mount its experiments, measure and hypothesize about the objects in question, and finally to fashion technologies that will hopefully more deeply integrate humankind with its environment, solve problems and cure diseases.  Still, the great ideal at the heart of all knowledge, namely, the desire to unify data and bring synthesis to multiplicity, floats temptingly over these four areas as it does over the divisions within each of them.  Knowledge by definition tends toward unity.

What philosophy offers the idioscopic (here I’m grafting roughly onto Maritain’s affirmative as roughly equivalent) is a unified whole of the diversity in the hard sciences.  While idioscopic science by its nature compartmentalizes and divides the study of the world, rightfully so within its respective subject-matter, it is at a loss in attempting to find unity within the multitude.  By contrast, the cenoscopic, in providing its own accounts and studies of the world based upon shared commonness, oftentimes misses the mark in its enquiry—one could think of the Eleatic philosophers and their cenoscopic inquiry concluding the impossibility of change and mutation and the eternal permanence to being.

A Habit Formed

Famously in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle quipped that among the commonly identified virtutes, many of them go unnamed.  A virtue famously for Aristotle is taken to be a mean between two vicious extremes, being informed by the goods sought after deficiently or in excess in both vices:[5]

So, virtue, is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to determine it.  It is a mean between two kinds of vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency; and also, for this reason, that whereas these vices fall short of or exceeding the right measure in both feelings and actions, virtue discovers the mean and chooses it.

The question I would like to ask is: what sort of “unnamed” virtue must a person be formed in today if both the cenoscopic and ideoscopic sciences are to be retained?  Is it healthy to siphon off one habit of cognizing the world in the absence of the other?  Are there points where both scientific inquiries intersect, or one ought to claim priority, and if so, is there a habit needed to secure this intersection?  If there can be found such a habit, what kind of vicious extremes could be seen to impede the exercise of such a virtuous inquiry?

Join the Conversation!

We’ll be discussing these and more conversations in our Philosophical Happy Hour this Wednesday (17 April 2024) and we’d love for you to join. Use the links below!

Philosophical Happy Hour

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Come join us for drinks (adult or otherwise) and a meaningful conversation. Open to the public! Held every Wednesday from 5:45–7:15pm ET.


[1] Creath 2022: “Logical Empiricism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).

[2] Maritain 1937: Distinguer pour unir ou Les degrés du savoir. Reference to the English translation by Bernard Wall, Degrees of Knowledge, 43

[3] Paine 2021: “On the Cenoscopic and Idioscopic and Why They Matter”, in Reality: a journal for philosophical discourse, online [PDF]: 5-6.

[4] Ibid, 12.

[5] c.335/34bc: Ἠθικὰ nικοάχεια in the English translation by J. Thomson, The Nicomachean Ethics, 42.

Language, Non-Existent Objects, and Semiotics

In the 19th and 20th centuries, a fever for scientific explanation of all phenomena gripped many an intellectual. Language, however, has proved resistant to the methods of modern science. Too many aspects of our experience prove irreducible to the empiriometric approach successful in disciplines such as chemistry or biology. This resistance vexes the reductionist’s mind. Most especially have non-existent objectivities—that is, the various ways in which we can talk about objects that do not exist as things—proved a great source of this vexation.

For natural languages, those we use in our everyday efforts at communication, cannot be conformed to precisely denotative maps of conceptual correspondence. As such, many attempted invention of artificial languages. But these artificial languages—although they have proved useful in development of technical apparatus—cannot convey the richness of experience found in our natural languages. They cannot, therefore, “explain scientifically” what those languages accomplish in our experience.

By contrast, let us hear what John Deely has to say about the relationship between language, non-existent objects, and semiotics:

Language Reconceived Semiotically

I hope to show how the semiotic point of view naturally expands… to include the whole phenomenon of human communication—not only language—and, both after and as a consequence of that, cultural phenomena as incorporative of, as well as in their difference from, the phenomena of nature. The comprehensive integrity of this expansion is utterly dependent upon the inclusion of linguistic phenomena within the scheme of experience in a way that does not conceal or find paradoxical or embarrassing the single most decisive and striking feature of human language, which is, namely, its power to convey the nonexistent with a facility every bit equal to its power to convey thought about what is existent.

Let me make an obiter dictum on this point. When I was working at the Institute for Philosophical Research with Mortimer Adler on a book about language (i.1969–1974, a collaboration which did not work out), I was reading exclusively contemporary authors—all the logical positivist literature, the analytic philosophy literature, all of Chomsky that had been written to that date—in a word, the then-contemporary literature on language. And what I found in the central authors of the modern logico-linguistic developments—I may mention notably Frege, Wittgenstein, Russell, Carnap, Ayer, and even Brentano with regard to the use of intentionality as a tool of debate—was that they were mainly intent on finding a way to assert a one-to-one correspondence between language and mind-independent reality and to say that the only time that language is really working is when it conveys that correspondence. In fact, however, much of what we talk about and think about in everyday experience is irreducible to some kind of a prejacent physical reality in that sense. There is no atomic structure to the world such that words can be made to correspond to it point-by-point. Nor is there any structure at all to which words correspond point-by-point except the structure of discourse itself, which is hardly fixed, and which needs no such prejacent structure in order to be what it is and to signify as it does.

It is wonderful to look at the history of science and culture generally from this point of view, which is, moreover, essential for a true anthropology. The celestial spheres believed to be real for some two thousand years occupied huge treatises written to explain their functioning within the physical environment. Other examples include more simple and short-lived creatures that populate the development of the strictest science, such as phlogiston, the ether, the planet Vulcan; and examples can be multiplied from every sphere. The complete history of human discourse, including the hard sciences, is woven around unrealities that functioned once as real in the thinking and theorizing and experience of some peoples. The planet Vulcan (my own favorite example alongside the canals of Mars) thus briefly but embarrassingly turned up as interior to the orbit of Mercury in some astronomy work at the turn of the last century. But Vulcan then proved not to exist outside those reports at all. The objective notion of ether played a long and distinguished role in post-Newtonian physical science—as central in its own way as the celestial spheres were in the Ptolemaic phase of astronomy’s development—before proving similarly to be a chimera.

So the problem of how we talk about nonexistent things, where nonexistent means nonexistent in the physical sense, is a fundamental positive problem with which the whole movement of so-called linguistic philosophy fails to come to terms. This is not just a matter of confusion, nor just a matter of language gone on holiday, but of the essence, as we will see, of human language.

To understand this fundamental insouciance of language, whereby it imports literary elements of nonbeing and fictional characters even into the sternest science and most realistic concerns of philosophy, we will find it necessary to reinterpret language from the semiotic point of view.

John Deely 2015: Basics of Semiotics, 8th edition, 19-20 (all emphasis added).

Commentary

While there are many points worthy of expansion in this brief text, I wish to highlight only three: namely, the three points in bold.

Signifying Non-Existent Objects

First allow me to pick up the last, namely, that “how we talk about nonexistent things, where nonexistent means nonexistent in the physical sense, is a fundamental positive problem with which the whole movement of so-called linguistic philosophy fails to come to terms.” It is a failure, indeed, in a presupposed principle—what we might term the positive formulation of nominalism—namely, that only individuals exist independently of the mind. This nominalist presupposition condemns any believer in it to incoherence. As Deely here hints, language and indeed all communication require a reality of the relation in order to function. If only individuals exist, relations must either be fictions of the mind or themselves individuals. But if relations are individuals, they would be individuals unlike all others—to the point that we would be predicating the term, “individual” equivocally.

Nominalism will prove a ripe topic for another day, however. Instead, let us simply say that its presupposition leaves one unable to draw meaningful connections between existent and nonexistent objects. If one’s theory of language struggles to account for the latter—except to posit them as meaningless—one will be forced, ultimately, to evict all meaning from language, for that theory has failed to recognize the essence of language itself.

The Structure of Discourse

Second, let us consider Deely’s statement that “Nor is there any structure at all to which words correspond point-by-point except the structure of discourse itself, which is hardly fixed, and which needs no such prejacent structure in order to be what it is and to signify as it does.” Within this, I wish to focus on the except clause—that is, the structure of discourse. What is this structure? We might alternatively name it the structure of thought’s expression. Consider a common problem: finding the right words to express yourself. We all experience this from time to time. We fumble in vagueness for not only the right semantic signifiers, but even the right structure in which to array them. Perhaps, we might even feel pressured to creative linguistic expression: coming up with new words or structures in the effort to convey our meaning.

This occasional creative necessity exhibits the lack of fixity characteristic of the structure of discourse. To complete the conception of any given idea, we must bring it forward into expression. If we cannot express it, it remains incomplete. While every concept may be derivative of prior experience and thinking, this dependence does not preclude the new idea. Were that the case, we would have no inventions, no fictional stories. And this brings us to…

The Power of Language

Third, what Deely calls language’s “power to convey the nonexistent with a facility every bit equal to its power to convey thought about what is existent.” This equal power of conveyance bears enormous importance for understanding the psychology of the human person. That we constitute in linguistic objectivity both ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ alone explains the constitution of all culture. Moreover, it explains how that cultural being can grow up at odds with human nature. It can also explain why some hold the profane as sacred, and why the distinction between fact and opinion (as well as value) are not so absolute as often presupposed.

Fully explaining this power of language takes much more background and exposition than can be provided here. Suffice it only to say that, if we are to understand the functioning of language, we must do so from a perspective which grasps the true breadth comprised within the structure of discourse.

As a final way of articulating the importance, the semiotic point of view, illuminates the development of linguistically-signified meaning from out of the indeterminacy of pre-linguistic experience.

Francisco Suárez – Disputationes Metaphysicae

Disputationes Metaphysicae

Francisco Suárez (5 January 1548–1617 September 25) became one of the most prominent figures in the Jesuit order and a leading philosopher and theologian of the late Scholastic period. He joined the Society of Jesus in 1564 and received his education in Salamanca, where he was deeply influenced by the Scholastic tradition, particularly the works of Thomas Aquinas. Suárez went on to teach theology at various prestigious institutions, including universities in Rome, Alcalá, Salamanca, and Coimbra.

His scholarly work, characterized by rigorous analysis and synthesis of Scholastic thought, culminated in his most famous work, the Disputationes Metaphysicae, published in 1597. This work comprehends all the most-prevalent discussions of metaphysics hi Suárez’s day, and exercised a significant influence on philosophical thought, influencing both Catholic and Protestant traditions. Suárez’s efforts in these metaphysical questions, especially his treatments of being, essence, causation, beings of reason, and relation marked him as a key transitional figure between medieval and modern philosophy.

We have here reproduced the 1861 Vives edition of the Disputationes Metaphysicae (originally in 2 volumes, here in 4) at an affordable cost (under $50, before taxes). Though this is not a critical edition, it serves as a good working copy for the original Latin of Suárez and may prove very useful. We have also made these four volumes available as a free PDF, here. If you can spare a few moments and a few dollars to support our work, please click below to make a donation.

Division of Volumes

The original Vives edition of the Disputationes Metaphysicae is spread across t.25 and t.26 of Suárez’s Opera Omnia. Here, we have divided these two into four (to fit printing restrictions):

  • Volume I-I (t.25): containing a summary of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Disputationes 1-13
  • Volume I-II (t.25): containing Disputationes 14-27.
  • Volume II-I (t.26): containing Disputationes 28-41.
  • Volume II-II (t.26): Containing Disputationes 42-54, an Index Rerum, Index Philosophicus, and Index Theologicus.

A detailed table of contents for the distinct disputationes contained in each volume is found below.

disputationes metaphysicae – complete text


DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICAE 1–13

  1. On the nature of first philosophy or metaphysics (De natura primae philosophiae seu metaphysicae).
  2. On the intelligible rationale of essence or the concept of being (De ratione essentiali seu conceptu entis).
  3. On the passions of being in common and its principles (De passionibus entis in communi et principiis ejus).
  4. On transcendental unity in common (De unitate transcendentali in communi).
  5. On individual unity and of its principle (De unitate individualiejusque principio).
  6. On formal and universal unity (De unitate formali et universali).
  7. On the various genera of distinctions (De variis distinctionum).
  8. On truth or the true which is a passion of being (De veritate seu vero quod est passio entis).
  9. On falsity or the false (De falsitate seu falso).
  10. On good or transcendental goodness (De bono seu bonitate transcendentali).
  11. On evil (De malo).
  12. On the causes of being in common (De causis entis in communi).
  13. On the material cause of substance (De materiali causa substantiae).

DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICAE 14–27

  1. On the material cause of accidents (De causa materiali accidentium).
  2. On the formal substantial cause (De causa formali substantiali).
  3. On the formal accidental cause (De causa formali accidentali).
  4. On the efficient cause in common (De causa efficiente in communi).
  5. On the proximate efficient cause, its causality, and all that is required for causing (De causa proxima efficiente, ejusque causalitate, et omnibus quae ad causandum requirit).
  6. On necessary causes, and free or contingent agents, wherein also are treated fate, fortune, and chance (De causis necessario, et libere seu contingenter agentibus, ubi etiam de fato, fortuna et casu).
  7. On the first efficient cause and its first action, which is creation (De prima causa efficiente, primaque ejus actione, quae est creatio).
  8. On the first efficient cause and another of its actions, which is conservation (De prima causa efficiente, et altera ejus actione, quae est conservatio).
  9. On the first efficient cause and another of its actions, which is cooperation, or concurrence with secondary causes (De prima causa, et alia ejus actione, quae est cooperatio, seu concursus cum causis secundus).
  10. On the final cause in common (De causa finali in communi).
  11. On the final cause or ultimate end (De ultima finali causa, seu ultimo fine).
  12. On the exemplar cause (De causa exemplari).
  13. On the comparison of causes to their effects (De comparatione causarum ad effecta).
  14. On the comparison of causes among themselves (De comparatione causarum inter se).

DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICAE 28–41

  1. On the division of being into infinite and finite (De divisione entis in infinitum et finitum).
  2. On the first and uncreated being, whether it exists (De primo et increato ente, an sit).
  3. On the first being or God, what He is (De primo ente seu Deo, quid sit).
  4. On the essence and existence of finite being as such, and their distinction (De essentia entis finiti ut tale est, et illius esse, eorumque distinctione).
  5. On the division of created being into substance and accident (De divisione entis creati in substantiam et accidens).
  6. On created substance in common (De substantia creata in communi).
  7. On the first substance or supposit and its distinction from nature (De prima substantia seu supposito, ejusque distinctione a natura).
  8. On created immaterial substance (De immateriali substantia creata).
  9. On material substance in common (De substantia materiali in communi).
  10. On the common rationale and concept of accident (De communi ratione, et conceptu accidentis).
  11. On the comparison of accident to substance (De comparatione accidentis ad substantiam).
  12. On the division of accidents into nine highest genera (De divisione accidentis in novem summa genera).
  13. On continuous quantity (De quantitate continua).
  14. On discrete quantity and the coordination of the category of quantity and its properties (De quantitate discreta, et coordinatione praedicamenti quantitatis et proprietatibus ejus).

DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICAE 42–54

  1. On quality and the species of it in common (De qualitate et speciebus ejus in communi).
  2. On potency (De potentia).
  3. On habits (De habitibus).
  4. On the contrariety of qualities (De qualitatum contrarietate).
  5. On the intension of qualities (De intensione qualitatum).
  6. On the real relations of created beings (De relationibus realibus creatis).
  7. On action (De actione).
  8. On passion (De passione).
  9. On time and duration in the universe (De quando, et in universum de durationibus).
  10. On place (De ubi).
  11. On posture (De situ).
  12. On habit or possession (De habitu).
  13. On the being of reason (De ente rationis).

How to Read Philosophy

Among the texts we pick up to read, some few will shape our thoughts and therefore our beliefs in ways much more profound than others. “No one opens a book on algebra with anxiety”, writes Brand Blanshard in his Philosophical Style, “as to whether the author is going to treat the binomial theorem roughly, or a book of physics with the feeling that hope will be blighted if Ohm’s law comes out badly.” So too, we might read histories of distant lands and foreign cultures with curiosity but no investment. On the other hand, when we read philosophy, we find ourselves faced with something of a personal nature. “But”, Blanshard continues, “people do feel that it is of importance whether their religious belief is honeycombed, or their hope of survival blasted, or even whether pleasure is made out to be the only good.”

Deadened Minds

Most of us are born inquisitive; we seek to know. Shortly after discovering speech, we learn to ask not only for things that we want, but what things are, and why they are the ways they are. But as we age, and mostly as we are subjected to modern methods of schooling, our inquisitiveness becomes curbed. In the words of Mortimer Adler:

What happens between the nursery and college to turn the flow of questions off, or, rather, to turn it into the duller chan­nels of adult curiosity about matters of fact? A mind not agi­tated by good questions cannot appreciate the significance of even the best answers. It is easy enough to learn the answers. But to develop actively inquisitive minds, alive with real questions, profound questions–that is another story.

Adler 1972: How to Read a Book, 270.

Much of modern education unfolds according to the pretense, held in unreflective consciousness, that knowledge is a possession; and that teachers hold it more than students, and students, in studying, dispose themselves to receive it. What, primarily, is learned by this model? Not to ask good questions. Good questions unveil our ignorance; they force us to search, again; they give the lie to knowledge as a possession!

Style and Philosophy

Often, when minds begin to wake from their unnatural, questionless slumber, they find authors whose answers stimulate thinking in ways unexpected, given the bland and rote education most have received. In recent decades, as the internet exposes a larger number of people to unorthodox thinkers, these writers ordinarily operate under the guise of deliberate provocateurs. Thus the popularity of some pseudonymous bloggers, such as Costin Alamariu, or the resurgent interest in writers like René Guénon. Their sway comes from the appearance of possessing special knowledge–deeper knowledge, knowledge that others don’t want you to have.

Writers of this sort, however, seem less interested in what might be properly called philosophy, but rather, the exercise of rhetorical persuasions toward their own beliefs. With talents of style, many fall under the spells they weave in words. Talented sophists have, since the days of Socrates, succeeded in making the worse appear as better, and vice versa. Further, they excel at making the wise seem foolish to the many, and their own foolhardiness appear as wisdom in its place.

Reading Philosophy against Sophistry

These points, scattered though they are, raise a question itself of pivotal importance in these our days of late modernity: how do we read philosophy, today, to distinguish what truly is wisdom from what merely persuades by style? How do we discern the true meanings of texts? Can we grasp abstruse reasoning from reading alone? What else is needed to pursue wisdom in the written word?

These, and many other questions, will obtain our attention this Wednesday at our Philosophical Happy Hour! Use the links below to join in the conversation.

Philosophical Happy Hour

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Come join us for drinks (adult or otherwise) and a meaningful conversation. Open to the public! Held every Wednesday from 5:45–7:15pm ET.

Expertise vs. Wisdom

Much has been said in the past decade about the “elite”—those with significant wealth, power, influence, and education (or, rather, the reputation garnered from attending specific schools, regardless of education actually attained)—and little of it positive. In our culture of political polarization and populism, to be “elite” is to be painted with two black marks: first, and principally, societal “privilege” (i.e., status unearned); second, being “out of touch” with the real living struggles of the common person. We hear also about the “laptop class”, a kind of bourgeoise of the information age. But while we might rail against the “elite”, do we really understand why they exist?

Technocracy and Technology

Every age has its elite. Natural talent results in authority and respect proportionate to that talent’s employment. This distribution, of course, is not always just. Professional athletes, undoubtedly, are far superior in their skills to average persons. But they receive disproportionate salaries: we should not pay so much to anyone for entertainment. So too, one could say, of CEOs, CTOs, and executives of every kind, for whom the key skill seems often a disregard of the morally righteous in favor of the profitable.

Undoubtedly, kings and lords and clergy have, in centuries past, likewise received disproportionate compensation. However, the elite of today are often afforded a protection not so readily found in bygone eras: namely, bureaucracy. Look around today at corporations violating laws, regulations—that skirt taxes, find loopholes to allow generally immoral behavior. Who is held accountable? Far fewer persons than actually responsible. Why?

We have all observed individuals occupying situations in life for which neither their character nor their intellect qualified them, and so placed only through nominal education, or birth or consanguinity.

T.S. Eliot 1949: Notes Toward a Definition of Culture

In a word: technocracy. We are ruled by experts: and never just one expert. Guidelines and mandates are the issuance of an individual only when he or she wishes to receive credit. If a failure, if unpopular, always it was the product of a team of experts. Why do we have so many experts in the first place?

In another word: technology. As we develop devices and methods that enable more and more precise control and manipulation of the world in which we live, the more expertise seems required to exercise this instrumental agency. Today, it is not only the case that everything we touch feels the influence of technology, but that the technological hand we use is connected to all the other technology, too. (Such is the effect of the digital network.)

A technological technocracy (or “technopoly”, to use Neil Postman’s term) has resulted in a very inhuman, incompetent form of governance.

Subsidiarity and Wisdom

But are we doomed to this technocratic incompetence? The technological perfusion of our lives today seems even more complete than in recent decades. Will not the bureaucracy increase? Will we not see a further fragmentary proliferation of experts—those who know very much about very little?

A certain technophobia today seems often an appropriate response to the advances of digital technology in particular: to flee the smartphone, to disconnect from the internet, to find a distant land where one might farm, work a trade, live a quiet life. But this retreat promises only temporary refuge for a few, and for a brief time. Technocracy unchecked grows only ever larger and more invasive.

Rather, we must seek to implement a more properly-human form of governance: subsidiarity. And just as technocracy demands of us experts—those narrow-minded functionaries of a bureaucratic system—subsidiarity requests wisdom.

Can we have Expertise and Wisdom together?

This Wednesday’s chat (2/7) will be the first in a series of related Philosophical Happy Hours: followed by a conversation on the natures of science and engineering (2/21) and another on the implementation of subsidiarity (2/28). We hope you will join us for this discussion and aid us in thinking through how it is that we, as a society might foster a culture of properly relating expertise and wisdom!

Philosophical Happy Hour

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Come join us for drinks (adult or otherwise) and a meaningful conversation. Open to the public! Held every Wednesday from 5:45–7:15pm ET.

2024 Winter: Good and Freedom in Aquinas’ De Veritate

Why do we call a thing “good”?  We have been calling things good since childhood, but, as with any conception so fundamental, it is challenging to unfold its meaning.  Given the multifarious use of this name, “good”, is there even a unity of meaning to discover?  Is it just that we call anything good merely because it occasions feelings of a certain kind, or is there something in things themselves that justifies calling them good? 

Thomas Aquinas proposes that, indeed, the conception of the good has a central meaning –  “that which is perfective in the manner of a final cause” – and so approves the dictum of Aristotle, that “the good is that which all seek”.

Affectivity is thus relevant to this central meaning of the good, but affectivity understood, in those beings that have it, as essentially correlated with real possibilities, with the relationship of a thing to that which would perfect or fulfill it.  This is the order to an end, or final cause – a challenge to a reductive modern paradigm in which reality contains no real possibilities, but only “actual facts” of a mechanical kind. 

In this seminar, we will follow Aquinas’s treatment of the good in questions 21-26 of his great work known as De veritate.  Our considerations will include the metaphysics of the good, the divine will, and the human faculties that engage with the good, namely human will and the capacity for free choice, and human sensuality.  We will also touch on the connections between some important passages in De veritate and the topic of evil. 

Therefore, among these three things that Augustine affirms, the last one, namely order, is the relation which the name of goodness implies. But the other two, that is species and mode, cause that relation. For species pertains to the very notion of the species which, inasmuch as it has being in another, is received in some determinate mode, since whatever exists in another exists within it in the manner of the receiver. Therefore, every good thing, inasmuch as it is perfective with respect to the notion of species and being, as taken together, has mode, species, and order. It has species with respect to the notion itself of species, it has mode with respect to existence, and order with respect to the condition of what perfects.

Thomas Aquinas i.1256-59: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q.21, a.6, c.

Registration

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Complete Lyceum Catalog – 2024

We have completed our 2024 catalog and preliminary schedule for all seminars and courses!  While these are, of course, always subject to change (life being ever-unpredictable), I am happy to announce this very exciting slate of philosophy seminars for the upcoming year:

Seminar Catalog 2024

Winter (Q1)

Introduction to Philosophical Thinking

– Brian Kemple

Phenomenology: Heidegger’s Method II

– Brian Kemple

Thinkers: Aquinas’ De Veritate – Good and Freedom

– Kirk Kanzelberger


Summer (Q3)

Culture & Politics: A Thomistic Defense of Democracy

– Francisco Plaza

Science: The Physics of Aristotle

– Daniel Wagner

Spring (Q2)

Philosophers and History

– Scott Randall Paine

Semiotics: an Introduction

– Brian Kemple

Metaphysics: Discovery of Ens inquantum Ens

– Brian Kemple


Fall (Q4)

Science: An Existential Thomistic Noetics – Maritain’s Degrees of Knowledge and Late-Life Works on Epistemology

– Matthew Minerd

Metaphysics: The Doctrine of Analogy

– Brian Kemple

Semiotics: The Difficulties of Technology

– Group seminar (multiple instructors)


Seven of the eleven seminars on our schedule are new, never before offered.  There may also be others added to the Summer schedule, drawing upon our archives (which are undergoing a massive overhaul to be more accessible and useful).  All-in-all, I find myself a bit giddy at the line-up for the year.  You will find descriptions for each seminar in this PDF.

Trivium, Latin, and Greek

We have also previously announced our Trivium, Latin, and Greek schedules. All of the core courses in these studies are available to every enrolled Lyceum Institute member. Sign up today to begin studying with us in January!

Looking forward to another great year of study and we hope you will join us!

On the Death of the Artist

A Lyceum Member proposes, as a topic for our 29 November 2023 Happy Hour: “How much does the artist’s intention factor into the meaning of his art? How can semiotic Thomism help us to answer this question? Can there be a more fitting interpretation of the art he makes than the one he intended? Is the more fitting interpretation, the ‘correct’ interpretation, even if it is not the one intended by the artist?  What is fittingness?”

Questions about the nature of art—a perennial inquiry renewed time and again—have resurfaced in recent years and months as intelligence-simulating pattern-recognition and reconstitution algorithms (commonly misnamed “Artificial Intelligence”) dramatically improve their abilities to produce graphical (and soon other) representations of human artistic creation. This is a rather complex way of asking: does AI produce art? To back these kinds of question into those written above, is there art without intention? Who is the artist when someone plugs a prompt into ChatGPT? How does the output of an intelligence-simulator correspond to artistic causality?

AI artists?

The above image was generated in less than 60 seconds with a relatively simple prompt. One can dissect it to discern the influences of various artists, famous, infamous, and virtually unknown alike; one might even be able to reconstitute the prompt from such analysis. So: who created the image? And what interpretations may be made of it?

Exemplar Causality and Intention

At the center of every work of art stands a formal cause: that is, the principle by which are arranged all the material parts making it to be what it is. When drawing a portrait, one seeks to capture the visage of the human person. There are countless material variations through which this might be achieved. A portrait may exhibit technical proficiency but fail inasmuch as the person does not truly appear within it. In this, we would say that it falls short formally. But the intrinsic formal constitution of the artistic work both relies upon and relates to an extrinsic formal cause as well, namely, the idea or plan in the mind of the artist.

This extrinsic formal cause may be termed the exemplar (later Scholastic philosophers called it the idea). As John Deely writes:

The first and obvious way in which a formal cause can be extrinsic to an effect, and the way which was principally considered in the history of the discussion of these questions, is again in the case of artifacts: the architect constructs a building out of materials and according to a plan which he has drawn up, and [1] this plan is then embodied in the building, so that it becomes a “Mies van der Rohe building”, for example, an instance and illustration of a definite architectural style and school; the artist [2] creates a painting as an expression of something within the artist, or models a work, such as a statue or a portrait, on something external which the artist nonetheless wishes to represent. Even [3] when the work is called “non-representative” and so strives to be a mere object with no significant power, as an expression it fails, in spite of itself, to be without significance. Extrinsic formal causality in this first sense came to be called ideal or exemplar causality among the Latins.

Deely 1994: New Beginnings, 160.

There are many points compressed within this paragraph worthy of extended consideration, but we will limit ourselves to the three annotated: first, [1] the embodiment of a plan in the work; second, [2] the internally-expressive rendering of something externally-extant; and third, [3] the invariable signification of productive expression.

Concerning the first [1], this point proves important to a fundamental understanding of art. The work of art terminates the act of the artist. It receives the expressive form in an embodied manner. Even performance art—the playing of music (or even 4’33”), a dance, juggling—requires an embodiment. But it is not just any embodiment that renders something “art”. There must be a definite plan: the exemplar cause. If I slip and happen to make the motions of a most stunning and beautiful pirouette, I fail to perform the ballerino’s art. There was no intent behind my performance, no plan, no exemplar cause.

Now, had there been—had I myself seen the artful spins of professional dancers and wished to emulate them—then, second [2], I would be expressing from my own conception an observation of something external. So too, if I draw a portrait of Audrey Hepburn, I must draw upon my impressions of her in memory, from movies, in photographs, etc. Even the most seemingly-innovative artistic creation relies upon the grasp of a form outside the self which is creatively transformed through the exemplar expression. We are imitative creatures.

To this point, third [3], we cannot create any forms that do not themselves, as existing in the embodied artistic product, further signify to others. Even the most wildly re-constituted expressive form still draws from the extrinsic causality of those things we have first grasped ourselves. Thus, “abstract” art yet falls under the auspices of interpretation.

Interpretation and Specifying Causality

Or, to put this otherwise: interpretation is always a part of artistic creation. This raises a difficult question, however: what do we mean by “interpretation”? It seems a word the meaning of which we often take for granted. Is it the drift of associations? The insight into “what is”? The relation of appearance to context? Anything at all?

Perhaps the easiest answer: interpretation is the working-out of an object’s meaning. “Meaning”, too, of course, presents a challenge. If, in the context of art, we presuppose meaning to reside principally in the intrinsic formal cause of a work, we simplify the conversation. For the form of the work—the embodiment of the artist’s intention—invariably specifies the audience. In other words, the audience can interpret the work according to its own complex of determinations and indeterminations. If I am somehow conditioned to hate all impressionist art, I will interpret all impressionist art hatefully. It cannot specify me otherwise. If, however, I am not so-determined, but remain open to its specification, I may interpret it other ways.

Sometimes, for instance, when we learn an artist’s intention behind his creation, it appears in different light. Sometimes better, sometimes worse. Other times, we may discover another work of art—or a philosophical premise—which allows us deeper insight into the work. This insight may be entirely outside the author’s intent, and, yet, rings true. But how do we justify these interpretations?

Life of Art?

To many, it may seem that death stands imminent for the artist. Intelligence-simulation threatens artistic life. It will discern and reconstitute patterns faster than we can even conceive them.

Or will it?

Can there be art without exemplar causality? Can machines interpret? Produce expressions? Does “artificial intelligence” produce art or… something else? Is it a medium for a new, emerging kind of artist? Come discuss these and other fascinating questions concerning the nature of art with us today, 29 November 2023! Links below:

Philosophical Happy Hour

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Come join us for drinks (adult or otherwise) and a meaningful conversation. Open to the public! Held every Wednesday from 5:45–7:15pm ET.