Humility: Wellspring of Virtue, or Cowardice in Disguise?

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A Philosophical Happy Hour on the nature of humility and its status in contemporary society.

What is Humility?

For reasons personal, professional, and perhaps preposterous, I’m attempting to learn French. However, I must confess: I am having a rough go of it. Though I’ve a bit of a knack for picking up languages, I nonetheless continue to struggle with French pronunciation. Moreover, a knowledge of Latin is hardly helping me derive vocabulary. (My final deathbed utterance will be “How the hell did hodie become aujourd’hui?”) All of this to say: such study requires not only much patience, but also much humility. It is humbling to accept that I’m not advancing quite as quickly as I would prefer, and that I’ll continue to make errors. C’est comme ça.

I suspect that all of us–if we’ve the humility to be honest–have experienced similar humilitations. However, humility occurs not only in study; humility can be spoken of in many ways. To name only a few domains, one may speak of: a) epistemic humility, or a recognition of the limits of human knowledge; b) moral humility, or a recognition of our struggle to lead a virtuous life; c) political humility, or a recognition of our fallibility in establishing good governance; d) cultural humility, or a recognition that one’s cultural and societal norms may not necessarily be superior to those of others; and e) existential humility, or a recognition that human existence, with reference to both the natural and supernatural, is marked by finitude.

With humility encompassing so many domains, it is prudent to ask: what, essentially, is humility? Though etymology lends a hand (Latin humus,ground—i.e., being grounded), it doesn’t take us very far. We can also define it as the opposite of pride, but this is merely a negative definition. (It also requires that we can define pride.) Let us take, as a modest starting point, Aquinas’s analysis of the virtue of humility (if not the vice of pride) in his Summa Theologiae. In the effort to define humility, an important question arises: is humility is a virtue? Philosophers disagree.[1] Is Aquinas right to consider humility a virtue (chiefly, a form of temperance), or is it something else?

Is Humility (Still) Desirable?

Most religious traditions still[2] exhort us to live humbly; moreover, most philosophers have defended the role of humility. Even so, some philosophers question the very desirability of humility.[3] So too, this questioning comes not only from philosophers, but also from many everyday citizens of liberal democracies. This questioning applies to personal humility as well as humility in broader societal aims and causes. For instance, most posthumanists claim that we can forego epistemic if not existential humility due to our unprecedented technological advances and the resulting control of nature. An increasing number of Americans suggest we can and must forego ethical and/or political humility in the face of political upheaval, with some defending even the use of violence to “protect our democracy.”  Many of these individuals defend such views and actions in the name of fortitude and defense of the truth; to think or act more humbly would be modest, weak, or cowardly. One may ask: is such behavior marked by prudent discernment of fortitude, or does it risk a replacement of humility with pride? (Perhaps a mix of both?)

Some Humble Inquiries

In short: the endeavor to define humility is not mere navel-gazing; our understanding of the nature and role of humility impacts our moral, political, epistemological, and even metaphysical commitments. To facilitate our discussion, please consider the following questions:

  1. What is humility? What are some virtues or qualities with which humility is commonly confused?
  2. What is pride? What are some virtues or qualities with which pride is commonly confused?
  3. What are some domains of life in which we see humility most and least? In which domains could we use more humility? In which domains could we correct false humility?
  4. Is it justifiable to be humble in some domains, but not others? (E.g., is it okay for an art critic to be morally humble, but culturally prideful?)
  5. Is humility desirable?
  6. How to distinguish a healthy love of self from a prideful self-obsession?
  7. Ought humility be primarily an individual pursuit, or can we speak of a collective and societal humility?
  8. Is the embrace of humility dependent upon theological commitments, or can we legitimately defend a “secular”, purely philosophical humility?

A Modest Proposal

We humbly request your presence this Wednesday (8 October 2025, from 5:45-7:15+ pm ET) as we explore the nature of humility.


[1] Though many philosophers consider humility a virtue, some instead think it to be more of a passion or “mindset.” Others yet do hold humility to be a virtue but, in practice, adopt the vicious extreme of false modesty: for instance, Hume and Kant espouse forms of epistemic humility far exceeding the more moderate reservations of Socrates.

[2] That said: some Christians–often due to political persuasion–are now challenging Jesus’ call to humility.

[3] Notably, Aristotle does not list ταπεινός as a virtue to be cultivated; humility is no vice, but it is a hint unbefitting of the magnanimous man. Most famously, Nietzsche rejects humility as a tool of Christian “slave morality”, used as a tool to curb one’s own life-affirming values.

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