Limits to the Common Good

We are all called to participate in the common good.  But are there limits to its commonality?  Are there natural proportions beyond which the “good” is no longer common?  Our Philosophical Happy Hour takes up this difficult question.

Whether through calls for a “common good constitutionalism” or appeals to the “ordo amoris”, the political question of the common good has been a commonplace of late within the discourse.  This retrieval is not the first, though it may be more high profile.  The Lyceum’s Happy Hour discussed the question of the common good and toleration of evil a few months ago.  This week, however, we want to focus on a different aspect of the question. 

While it was recognized, in that earlier conversation, that prudential judgment concerning the common good requires occasional toleration of evils—but never complicity in their pursuit—here we discuss the proper proportion of the common good.  That is: we may easily see a common good (which is to say, not an aggregate of material goods but a participation in that by which human persons can flourish) among a family, a neighborhood, or a town or small city.

But what of a state containing millions?  Tens, hundreds of millions?  What of the whole earth?  Do we share in a common good with those on the other side of the earth?  In what respect?  With what obligations?

Multitude and Community

The idea that a natural proportion is necessary to the common good is ancient.  Aristotle, in his Politics VII.4, states that:

This… is evident from the facts: that it is difficult—perhaps impossible—for a city that is too populous to be well managed.  Of those that are held to be finely governed, at any rate, we see none that is lax in regard to [restricting the] number [of inhabitants]… For law is a certain sort of order, and good governance must of necessity involve good order.  But an overly excessive number is incapable of partaking in order… there is a certain measure of size in a city as well, just as in all other things—animals, plants, instruments: none of these things will have its own capacity if it is either overly small or excessive with respect to size, but it will sometimes be wholly robbed of its nature, and at other times in a poor condition (1326a–b).

Now, it is worth noting that Aristotle here is focused primarily on the city, and seems to admit—or at least allow for the possibility—that a nation or larger unit of governance can be of greater population.  But it would seem, simultaneously, that the problems faced by a city grown too large or populous would affect also a nation.  The possibilities for genuine commonality seem too difficult to manage.

Most especially does this seem to be a problem within a pluralistic society.

Limits to Communication of the Good

To put this otherwise, a pluralistic society seems often divided not merely at the level of particular moral or particular premises, but in a way so fundamental as to absolutely impede those conflicting premises’ resolution.  We run into a situation where communication becomes impossible (not in principle, but in fact).

This seems an obstacle to the idea that the common good could ever truly comprise societal units beyond a certain scale.  Put otherwise, on a purely theoretical level, it seems there is a common good of all humankind.  On a practical level, contrariwise, it seems it is not and perhaps cannot realistically be participated by all.

That is: could we ever effectively communicate the true common good that widely?  It seems, indeed, that much of what we mean by the “common good” is something grasped not through abstract linguistic signification but lived experienced.  How could that ever be communicated?

Participating in Our Common Good

Thankfully, ours is a small group: so you are free to join the common good of our Philosophical Happy Hour this Wednesday (11 November 2026, from 5:45-7:15+ pm ET) as we think through the scale and limit of the common good.  A few questions to orient our conversation:

• Is there an upper limit to the number of persons who can meaningfully participate in a common good?  What determines that limit?  Is it something natural or does it depend on circumstances?
• Can we genuinely intend a common good without understanding its concrete requirements or possessing any influence over its realization?
• Does increasing the size of a community necessarily diminish the quality of participation in its common good, or can institutions preserve—perhaps even improve—that participation?
• Can smaller communities mediate our participation in larger common goods, or do their particular interests inevitably introduce competition and division?
• Is there a genuine common good of the whole human race?  If so, what would participation in it require, and how would it differ from participation in a local or national community?