On Slicing Through “Conspiracy Theories”

A Philosophical Happy Hour on how we ought to approach conspiracy theories.
“The truth is out there”?

Human history finds itself interwoven, in every age, with falsehood. We suffer, to steal a phrase of Umberto Eco’s, a “fatal imbalance between story and plot”—between what underlies, the reality, and what sits atop, the narrative.

In recent years, as the digital medium has become our primary form of communication, this imbalance has grown ever-larger. The extraordinary narrative no longer occurs as the occasional oddity, but seems part of daily life. Some of these narratives have become so mundane they are accepted with little consciousness by large swathes of the population as given fact. Of course, the imbalance may (and probably oftener than we have suspected) be inverted: that is. the narrative may be less monstrous, less fantastic and unbelievable than the reality.

How are we to navigate this tangled web in which we live?

The Principle of Parsimony

Best known as “Ockham’s Razor”, the principle of parsimony, in fact, long antedates the nominalist philosopher: being rooted, instead, in Aristotle and articulated explicitly by both St. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. This principle—that one should not unnecessarily include in explanation more causes than are in fact necessary—seems perhaps more necessary than ever, today, in our world of “fake news” and a seeming increase of paranoia about nefarious forces pulling every string in the world.

As St. Thomas, in one of many formulations, articulates this principle: “It is superfluous if something comes to be through many principles which can be made through fewer” – Quod potest fieri per pauciora, superfluum est si fiat per plura. (Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, lib.1, lec.11, n.95). This belongs not only to a thing’s coming to be physically, of course, but also to its coming to be explained.

A Conspiracy Case

A member writes:

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My question is: How can the principle of parsimony be properly applied to conspiracy theories, and how do we guard against its misuse? I ask this particularly with reference to theories that proliferate explanatory entities or rely on unobservable conditions to preserve internal consistency. (Please note, I’m not a fan of the term “Conspiracy Theory” which in its modern usage is often wielded as a tool to avoid engaging uncomfortable ideas).

A case study: the “Siri Thesis,” which claims that Cardinal Giuseppe Siri was elected pope in 1958 and 1963 but forced to resign under nuclear threat. I have studied and translated (thanks ChatGPT!) several works about Siri and found no substantive evidence for this claim. Proponents typically cite ambiguous remarks (E1) and hearsay testimony (E2) as support.

I argue instead that Siri’s lifelong loyalty to the papacies of John XXIII and Paul VI and his extensive participation in (and subsequent defense of) Vatican II (CE1) align with his known public character (CC1). In response, proponents argue that he was under threat his entire life (C2), and thus all his public behavior is unreliable. Some go further, claiming he was replaced by a body double.

This leads to an inflation of explanatory components:

• Siri Thesis: (C1) Siri elected pope + (E1) ambiguous remarks + (E2) hearsay + (C2) lifelong nuclear threat
• Counter: (CC1) Consistent character + (CE1) observable behavior and writings

However, it seems to me that if C2 is accepted, then E1 becomes suspect—why trust Siri’s ambiguous remarks if he was never free to speak? To preserve E1’s value, proponents must introduce an additional claim (C3): that in these moments, despite ongoing nuclear threat, Siri spoke freely and revealed his true mind. Therefore, the real explanatory component of the Thesis adherent is more like this:

• Siri Thesis: (C1) Siri elected pope + (E1) ambiguous remarks + (E2) hearsay + (C2) lifelong nuclear threat + (C3+) rationale explaining why Siri would reveal his true mind while under nuclear threat

Thus, the theory multiplies entities: hidden threats, hearsay, ambiguous statements, and hypothetical nuclear threats, and ad hoc exceptions. By contrast, the counter argument seems to require no such additions—it is consistent with observed behavior and public record. This seems to be a textbook case where Ockham’s Razor favors the simpler explanatory component.

So I return to my question: How do we apply the principle of parsimony responsibly in the context of such kinds of theories, and how do we protect against it misuse? Is my application of the principle valid?

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Can we slice through the theories?

It is likely that nearly every week we hear of some new conspiracy theory: usually, that someone or some entity rich and powerful seeks to gain greater control and power over how we—the normal people—live our lives. We hear of stolen elections, of malicious vaccines; of rigged studies and polls; of inside government assassination attempts; foreign coups; foreign interference or psychological warfare; currency schemes; nefarious plots in religious organizations; sex cults; poisoned food supplies; and so on and on. Does the principle of parsimony arm us against the falsehoods and enable us to discover the truth?

Join us this Wednesday (26 March 2025) for our Philosophical Happy Hour (5:45–7:15pm ET; latecomers welcome!) as we discuss living in an age of “post-truth” and its corresponding growth in “conspiracy theories”.