A Philosophical Happy Hour on the structure and merits of Immanuel Kant’s key contributions to theories of knowledge and morality.
Immanuel Kant’s philosophy remains a turning point in the history of thought, one that has shaped not only modern theories of knowledge—which “epistemology” has wound its way into countless other domains of human activity—but also moral theory. His Critique of Pure Reason sought to secure the foundations of knowledge by limiting it—proposing that the mind does not passively receive reality but actively structures it. His Critique of Practical Reason took a similar path, grounding moral obligation not in an external order but in the self-legislation of reason.
This twofold “Copernican revolution” has drawn extensive criticism, particularly from those within the Scholastic tradition, who see in Kant’s approach a systematic and powerful opposition to realism. The question is whether, despite this break of human understanding and moral action from roots in a mind-independent reality, we must respect Kant’s thinking nonetheless, and take it seriously.
Thoughts on Knowledge
Kant’s theory of knowledge centers around the claim that we do not know things as they are in themselves but only if we can apply categories of an a priori conceptual framework to their appearances to us, under the “primary intuitions of time and space”. Space, time, causality—these, as Kant presents them, are not features of the world independently existing but rather conditions imposed by the mind upon the contents of experience. By setting these as necessary conditions for knowledge, Kant attempts to establish an “objective” scientific basis for philosophical questioning while ruling out speculative metaphysics and radical subjectivity alike—ensuring that knowledge is always confined within the bounds of universal structures applicable to possible experiences.
Yet does this locus of knowledge in the mind really accomplish its goal? For the Scholastic, knowledge is inherently relational—that is, knowledge consists in acts by which the mind is conformed to mind-independent intelligible being. Kantian knowledge, contrariwise, is fundamentally constructive rather than receptive. If all the formal objects of cognition we possess are formally structured by the knowing subject, can we still say that our knowledge corresponds to reality? Or have we, instead, created a system in which thought refers only to thought and, to accomplish any actual “universality” in knowledge—necessary that it be scientific—we must “leap” across the divide, and presume something as true about the things in themselves?
Put otherwise: if the conditions of knowledge are wholly within the subject, does this not make every act of knowing a kind of circular reference, in which we never move beyond our own mental frameworks?
Thoughts on Morality
Kant’s moral theory, in many ways, both follows and mirrors his theory of knowledge. Just as knowledge is shaped by the subject’s categories, so too is morality determined not by external realities but by practical reason itself. The categorical imperative (not necessarily Kant’s final word, but certainly his most influential on the topic of ethics), commands that we act only according to maxims that could be willed as universal laws. This imperative does not derive from nature or divine command but from the structure of rational agency. Autonomy, the ability of a will to determine itself freely—and neither teleology nor virtue—is the foundation of Kantian ethics.
For the Scholastic tradition, however, moral law is discovered in the mind-independent realities of the world; not something created by our own actions. It is rooted in the natural order, which human reason apprehends and follows in conducting its own actions. If Kant is correct, the moral law is not something inscribed in reality but something reason legislates for itself; somehow, this resonates with many persons. Why?
Put otherwise, this shift has had profound implications. In traditional moral philosophy, the meaning of moral terms—justice, goodness, duty—is anchored in realities external to the agent. But in Kant’s system, moral meaning is generated from our own volition—and thus we take on a greater responsibility, as we are burdened with a greater freedom. But we must ask: can a law be truly universal—can it be applicable to anyone other than the self—if its only foundation is reason’s own self-consistency?
What merit in the thoughts of Immanuel Kant?
Kant sought to limit knowledge’s range and establish strict structures in order to preserve its certainty. But does this limitation achieve its goal, or does it collapse into a form of nominalist idealism that leaves knowledge ultimately ordered towards a solipsistic coffin? Likewise: he sought to establish morality on the autonomy of reason, but does this autonomy ultimately depend upon an externally-constituted order of meaning that his system cannot fully acknowledge?
Join us this Wednesday (19 March 2025) for our Philosophical Happy Hour (5:45–7:15pm ET; latecomers welcome!) to weight the merits and faults in Kant’s thinking and its consequences for the human race.
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Come join us for drinks (adult or otherwise) and a meaningful conversation. Open to the public! Held every Wednesday from 5:45–7:15pm ET.
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