What is “Reality”?

We often say that things are or are not real.  But what does this really mean?  Though a common conception upon which we all rely, “reality” proves rather slippery to describe.  Join our Philosophical Happy Hour as we try to grasp it.

What do we mean when we call something “real”?  It sounds simple—almost embarrassingly so.  “You don’t know what ‘real’ means?”  Reality is just… reality.  It is what it is.  It is what actually exists.  What is really there.

But press beyond these near-tautological statements and we find our ordinary languages for discussing the “real” becomes almost immediately confused.  A dream is not “real”—yet the dream certainly occurs.  Is it just the “content” that is unreal?  Pain may have no visible external object and nevertheless be quite real; as certainly real as a “broken heart”.  Numbers are not physical objects—you cannot find “one” anywhere in the universe—but few people would venture to therefore call them fake (unless you’re on the Tucker Carlson show).  A fictional character does not exist, yet Benedict Cumberbatch plays a much better Sherlock Holmes than Robert Downey Jr.; how can we say “better” or “worse” of what is unreal?

So what exactly are we saying by the word?  It seems more or less like a container into which is thrown everything that is not nothing.

Being and Thing

Perhaps we can turn to an older distinction, often lost even in the history of philosophy, to clarify our use.  Avicenna (980–1037ad) distinguished two basic notions (i.e., notions cannot be defined by anything prior): being and thing (mawjūd and shayʾ)—which were translated into Latin as ens and res—from which latter we receive our English real.  Many Scholastic philosophers and theologians, including Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and Duns Scotus (1266–1308), took up this distinction in their work.

These two terms do not signify two entirely different objects, but rather, the same object under different aspects. Being (ens) points toward the fact that something is; thing (res) toward what that something is—that is, its definite nature or intelligible rationale.

Does this help us ask the question of what makes something “real”?  Or of what we mean by “reality”?  It certainly does not solve the problem; but it might suggest to us a greater depth to the object signified by the term than mere existence, pure and simple.

I believe this raises two further questions.

1) Must the “Real” Be Independent?

We often speak as though what is “really real” is what exists entirely on its own, independently of aught else.  “Dependence” sounds like a certain diminution of a thing’s reality.  But this, I believe, is a difficult position to maintain once we consider relations.

For instance, we say that a father really is the father of his son; or, conversely, someone might question whether he really is the father.  We say that a creature really depends upon its cause; what does that mean, when the cause no longer exists?  Or we might say, “The Lyceum Institute is real”.  But where is it?  Where does it exist?  We might (attempt to) reduce a university to its buildings or charter; what about a digital institute?  Put otherwise, these relations do not exist as separate quasi-substances floating between things while not yet things themselves—and yet neither are they merely fictions of thought.

Does this change or challenge our understanding of “reality”?

2) What Makes a Relation Real?

Suppose two things are merely thought together: “There is a killer hiding in my basement”.  There is not really.  As such, the relation between subject and predicate exists only on the basis of thought.  But—what if I keep thinking this, over and over again?  Could this turn into a real fear, even if there is no real basis?  Can something be unreal in itself and yet real “to me”?

The reality of relation is a loaded and difficult metaphysical question.  But I believe it is an important one, even if we can only scratch the surface here.  What the question itself—to say nothing of the answer—helps us to see is that “reality” is indeed a slippery term.

This Conversation Is (Will Be) Real

Even if we are not entirely sure what it means, I can guarantee that our conversation this Wednesday (30 September 2026, from 5:45-7:15+ pm ET) will undoubtedly be real—with real people, really thinking.  And you are really invited to come think through these and similar questions with us:

• When we call something “real”, what are we actually predicating of the subject: its existence, its independence from thought, in-itself intelligibility, causal efficacy… or something else?
• Does the distinction between ens and res help clarify “reality”?  Is the “real” better approached through the fact that something is, or through the fact that it is intelligible?
• Can something be genuinely “real” without independent existence: as for instance, a relation, a memory, an institution?
• What makes a relation real rather than merely “of reason”?  Is a real effect sufficient evidence?
• Are there cases where something is intelligible and determinate without being real, or real without being fully intelligible to us?