An intellectually vigorous soul does not seek justification of its conclusions, but the truth of the matter. All too often, however, our reasoning is applied not to the discovery of inquiry’s foundations but thrown into the midst of a battle. This today is what we face: either you are with or against, an ally or an enemy, one of mine or the other. That each “side” may have a part of the truth and hold itself to something false does not even find itself raised as a question.
This ought to be a source of shame both moral and intellectual, for it undermines both together at once. It leads to the outsourcing of thinking to “experts” and to the ever-increasing moral tyranny of those who do not know how to think (for unthinking invariably breeds arrogance). Let us listen to a man of great intellectual vigor on the point, C.S. Peirce:
Scientific Humility
56. The effect of mixing speculative inquiry with questions of conduct results finally in a sort of half make-believe reasoning which deceives itself in regard to its real character. Conscience really belongs to the subconscious man, to that part of the soul which is hardly distinct in different individuals, a sort of community-consciousness, or public spirit, not absolutely one and the same in different citizens, and yet not by any means independent in them. Conscience has been created by experience just as any knowledge is; but it is modified by further experience only with secular slowness [that is, a pace set in a sense by the whole of humankind].
57. When men begin to rationalize about their conduct, the first effect is to deliver them over to their passions and produce the most frightful demoralization, especially in sexual matters. Thus, among the Greeks, it brought about pæderasty and a precedence of public women over private wives. But ultimately the subconscious part of the soul, being stronger, regains its predominance and insists on setting matters right. Men, then, continue to tell themselves they regulate their conduct by reason; but they learn to look forward and see what conclusions a given method will lead to before they give their adhesion to it. In short, it is no longer the reasoning which determines what the conclusion shall be, but it is the conclusion which determines what the reasoning shall be. This is sham reasoning. In short, as morality supposes self-control, men learn that they must not surrender themselves unreservedly to any method, without considering to what conclusions it will lead them. But this is utterly contrary to the single-mindedness that is requisite in science. In order that science may be successful, its votaries must hasten to surrender themselves at discretion to experimental inquiry, in advance of knowing what its decisions may be. There must be no reservations.
58. The effect of this shamming is that men come to look upon reasoning as mainly decorative, or at most, as a secondary aid in minor matters – a view not altogether unjust, if questions of conduct are alone to interest us. They, therefore, demand that it shall be plain and facile. If, in special cases, complicated reasoning is indispensable, they hire a specialist to perform it. The result of this state of things is, of course, a rapid deterioration of intellectual vigor, very perceptible from one generation to the next. This is just what is taking place among us before our eyes; and to judge from the history of Constantinople, it is likely to go on until the race comes to a despicable end.
59. When society is broken into bands, now warring, now allied, now for a time subordinated one to another, man loses his conceptions of truth and of reason. If he sees one man assert what another denies, he will, if he is concerned, choose his side and set to work by all means in his power to silence his adversaries. The truth for him is that for which he fights.
60. The next step which is to be expected in a logical development not interrupted by accidental occurrences will consist in the recognition that a central authority ought to determine the beliefs of the entire community. As far as morals and religion go, this plan admirably fulfills its purpose of producing uniformity. But in order that it may do this, it is desirable that there should be another less absolute authority which shall declare, not infallibly but yet with a weight of collective learning, the propositions which science from time to time puts out of reasonable doubt, and which shall aid the researches of competent investigators. The value of such services in the development of science is immense; though they are accompanied by very serious disadvantages in not allowing to unofficial studies the weight which ought to be accorded to them. The history of science is full of examples of this sort.
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