A Philosophical Happy Hour on basic questions of our noetic experience. In our conversation, we will examine these different approaches of foundationalism and anti-foundationalism, ask about their merits, demerits, whether they rest upon certain presuppositions, whether these presuppositions have justification—and what is the meaning of belief. In what follows, we provide brief descriptions of the issue and the approaches to it.
How do we know that we know? What justifies our beliefs? Put otherwise, how can we have certitude that our knowledge is true?
Foundationalism
Foundationalism is a philosophical theory asserting that certain fundamental beliefs serve as the ultimate justification for all other beliefs. These foundational beliefs are typically considered self-evident, infallible, or derived from sensory experience. Thinkers such as René Descartes and G.E. Moore appear to argue that without such basic beliefs, our knowledge structure would collapse, leading to an infinite regress where every belief requires another belief for justification. Alvin Plantinga famously proposed his “Reformed Epistemology”, wherein belief in God is held as a basic belief upon which others may be founded. Roderick Chisholm has argued for “self-presenting states”—such as the experience of pain—which require no inference and thus exemplify non-inferential beliefs.
Thinkers appear drawn to foundationalism for its stability: the presence of an immutable, irrefutable truth gives us an Archimedean point upon which to build our lives. Most of antiquity has held to positions which could be described as foundationalist. The Aristotelian articulation, for instance, of the principle of non-contradiction appears to posit that “the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect” as a foundation of all knowledge. Similarly, sensations and even primary intellectual insights have an apparent “givenness”. If belief results in action—in behaving in a certain way, that is—then foundationalist approaches seemingly strive to base that action upon the truth.
However, there seem to be many difficulties in fully justifying these “givens”. Do we truly discover any belief which does not require some further justification? why then, does it seem that any belief can be doubted? Are any of our sense-perceptions truly given—or are they not themselves always received consequent to prior experience or knowledge?
Anti-Foundationalism
Thus it is that anti-foundationalism rejects the notion of infallible basic beliefs. Philosophers such as Wilfred Sellars, Richard Rorty, and W.V.O. Quine argue that knowledge consists rather in a web of beliefs, where no single belief holds a privileged status. Instead, beliefs are justified by their coherence within the entire belief system. This approach emphasizes pragmatism and the adaptability of knowledge. As such, it holds belief as essentially localized, rather than universal.
The anti-foundationalist approach draws adherents for its flexibility. Where foundationalism requires a perhaps-dubious absolute belief, anti-foundationalism and its emphasis upon coherence draws upon a multitude of beliefs. Thus, one belief being subject to doubt does not necessarily undermine the whole. The criterion for beliefs’ justifications, then, is not certitude, but applicability to one’s current situation. Put otherwise, the coherentist simply asks: do my beliefs allow me to attain the good here and now?
Of course, many objections are raised to anti-foundationalism: primarily that it gives rise to relativism and subsequent struggles for power, that it results in a kind of circularity (justifying X because of A, B, and C; justifying C because of A, B, and X, etc.), and that it destroys our common bases of knowledge (such as sensation).
Justification of Belief
Critically examining the distinction between these two approaches reveals an underlying problem. Foundationalism’s apparent strength lies in its provision of a stable base for knowledge. Yet it is opposed for its frequent difficulty in identifying truly self-evident beliefs and the avoidance of infinite regress. Anti-foundationalism, with its flexible and adaptive nature, offers a pragmatically useful alternative but seems invariably to fall into relativism and skepticism, where the absence of foundational beliefs undermines confidence in any knowledge.
But one has to note that the proponents of both theories, at least as given under these names—foundationalist and anti-foundationalist—seem rather historically myopic, with little attention paid to most philosophy prior to the 17th century (and even then, only in a narrow window). They speak often about the “justification of belief”—but give nominal definitions of belief only… and seldom, if ever, seem to think through the meaning of “justification”.
Is something profoundly missing from this debate?
Join the Conversation
This Wednesday (12 June 2024) we will be taking up this discussion of foundationalism, anti-foundationalism, and the justification of belief at our weekly Philosophical Happy Hour. Open to the public (links below)! Join us as we ask:
- Does “foundationalism” name a truth? Do we need an absolute and irrefutable belief?
- Are there essential problems with foundational beliefs? Does anti-foundationalism have a leg (or twenty) to stand upon?
- What are beliefs? What is justification?
- What does it mean for a belief to be foundational?
- And more!
Philosophical Happy Hour
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Come join us for drinks (adult or otherwise) and a meaningful conversation. Open to the public! Held every Wednesday from 5:45–7:15pm ET.
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