ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ
Heraclitus
Today when we hear the word “diversity”, our minds may well go towards the oft-discussed issue of political controversy. Without entering into that controversy itself, allow me to use it, nevertheless, to establish the topic for this week’s Philosophical Happy Hour. That is, underlying the controversy are metaphysical disagreements—felt by most but articulated by few, and disputed by hardly any. First, what the name “diversity” signifies does not appear commonly agreed upon by all. Many might voice something of this underlying difficulty, but often in a way which yet presupposes some meaning of the term’s significance which presupposition is left undefended. Second, and much more importantly, diversity entails an inherent tension with commonality. Our experience of the world brings us, inevitably, into this tension. We know no objects but through their differences from one another; and yet, knowing these differences, we may and inevitably do group them somehow together, hold them in some kind of unity.
Thus it is that Heraclitus can say we never step into the same river twice (for the water is always different), while Parmenides asserts that becoming and passing away, change and alteration are but names (for the river is always the river). Resolving this and alike difficulties—something which must be done again and again, each mind wrestling with these concepts so troublesome accurately to realize, concepts that do not reduce to a problem to be solved—requires first that we realize precisely the question(s).
One Question, or Many?
We might think the question of the “one and the many” is just one question: how do we reconcile the diversity we encounter with the commonality by which it is intelligible? But looking at the history of thought, we find many attempts to answer this question—which attempts, themselves, spark yet further questions. To help orient us, let us consider this passage from W. Norris Clarke’s One and the Many:
As soon as I attempt to take a synoptic view of all beings as beings, to compare all beings together under the aspect of their actual existence, I discover that I am obliged to affirm two apparently opposing propositions about each one of these beings. I am compelled to affirm that every single real being, compared to every other, is at once similar to every other, because each one is, exists, is real; and yet dissimilar to every other, because each one is precisely this being and not that one. In a word, A is, B is, etc., but A is not B, etc. Both of these basic attributes must be maintained, if I am to do justice to my experience and to the common bond underlying all expressions of my experience, namely, the “is” of judgment, whether the existential “is” asserting existence itself (“This exists”) or the attributive “is” applying a real predicate to a real subject (“This is a human being”).
– W. Norris Clarke, S.J., 2001: The One and the Many, 73-74.
One side of the picture, the distinction and diversity of beings, is obvious; but the commonness or unifying bond must also be affirmed. Without this common unifying bond, I could not even assert that the differences are real. For it is a general principle—which we here run into for the first time—that all distinction implies a deeper underlying bond of unity; it is impossible to compare any two diversities except on the basis (at least implicitly presupposed) of something underlying that they have in common—which in the present case would be that they are both present on the same “playing field” of existence in order to be compared to one another. Total diversities, with nothing whatsoever in common between them, are incomparable, in fact unthinkable. (Stop here and meditate a little on this very simple but very deep and pregnant principle of all thought and being, to which oriental thinkers have been especially sensitive.)
Hence two main problems [where rather I would say, “difficulties”] confront the metaphysician here: (1) One of fact: must we take seriously both the multiplicity and the oneness of beings, or can we affirm only one aspect and deny the other as mere appearance, illusion, or projection of our minds? Some philosophers have attempted the latter, drastic “solution.” (2) One of explanation: If we take both aspects seriously, how can they both be reconciled, fitted together, without contradiction? What kind of unity is involved? How can both the unity and the diversity be harmonized within each being? This is the challenge now awaiting our solution.
What positions we adopt on the two difficulties here—which we might also name the noetic and the ontological—constitute fundamental positions. Most people do not adopt their positions consciously, explicitly, or through reflection. Perhaps it is time for such metaphysical nonchalance to be repealed.
Metaphysical Resolutions
To paraphrase the words of Oliva Blanchette (in his book written at much the same time as Clarke’s), anyone who does not explicitly study or formulate a theory of metaphysics will be a metaphysician nonetheless—only an unwitting one. So join us this Wednesday (7/17/2024) as we take on the topic of the one and the many, and attempt to wrestle with these difficulties:
- Is the unity of the apparently diverse phenomena of our experience only a fabrication of our own minds? A “common naming” of thoroughly-individual beings?
- What do we even mean by “unity”? Or “plurality”?
- If you and I are two individual human beings, and my factual existing or not-existing does nothing to your factual existence, how can we be said to be “the same” in anything but name?
- Is “participation” part of the answer? Or a problem that needs to be solved?
- How do these metaphysical commitments (or confusions) affect our other beliefs?
- And more!
philosophical happy hour
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Come join us for drinks (adult or otherwise) and a meaningful conversation. Open to the public! Held every Wednesday from 5:45–7:15pm ET.
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