On the Renaissance and Human Dignity

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A Philosophical Happy Hour on the notion of human dignity as conveyed through thinkers of the Renaissance.

The philosophy of the Renaissance—a somewhat deceptive but now inescapably common name for the movement, occurring roughly (with some notable outliers) between 1350–1650, to retrieve Platonic thinking, emphasize the arts of grammar and rhetoric over that of logic, and to place the human being at the center of life—has been characterized in many ways.  Each claim just made about it in the prior, for instance, can be disputed.  The common caricature (as with most simplified generalizations) shows it as a time of light, happy, and free emergence from the dark, oppressive “middle ages”.

Now, our purpose in this Happy Hour is not to delve into the depths of Renaissance philosophy.  Nor do we intend to provide any historical survey.  Rather, we wish to focus upon a single concept often held characteristic of the Renaissance thinkers: human dignity.

Texts on Human Dignity

Here, we will consider a few quotes from three thinkers often taken as typical of the Renaissance.  First is Francis Petrarch (1304–1374); here, in his “Ascent of Mont Ventoux”, Petrarch relates the experience of—having ascended the mountain—opening Augustine’s Confessions and reading from the tenth book:[1]

“And men go to admire the heights of mountains, the great floods of the sea, the huge streams of the rivers, the circumference of the ocean, and the revolutions of the stars—and desert themselves.”  I was stunned, I confess.  I bade my brother, who wanted to hear more, not to molest me, and closed the book, angry with myself that I still admired earthly things.  Long since I ought to have learned, even from pagan philosophers, that “nothing is admirable besides the mind; compared to its greatness nothing is great.”

Second is Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), who in his Theologia Platonica relates a conception of what it means to say that the human being is in the imago Dei:[2]

Finally, man imitates all the works of the divine nature, and he brings to completion, corrects, and improves the works of the lower nature.  Thus, the power of man is similar to that of the divine nature; insofar as man governs himself through himself—that is, by means of his own deliberation and skill—he is not narrowly bound within the limits of bodily nature, and he emulates every single work of the higher nature.

Third is Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), who seems to deny that the human being as a fixed nature, but chooses what he will be himself:[3]

At man’s birth the Father placed in him every sort of seed and sprouts of every kind of life.  The seeds that each man cultivates will grow and bear their fruit in him.  If he cultivates vegetable seeds, he will become a plant.  If the seeds of sensation, he will grow into brute.  If rational, he will come out a heavenly animal.  If intellectual, he will be an angel, and a son of God.  And if he is not contented with the lot of any creature but takes himself up into the center of his own unity, then, made on spirit with God and settled in the solitary darkness of the Father, who is above all things, he will stand ahead of all things.  Who does not wonder at this chameleon which we are?  Or who at all feels more wonder at anything else whatsoever?

Human Cosmos

What do we make of these three passages?  It is not fair, of course, to judge any thinkers on isolated passages that have been so decontextualized.  Such is not our intent.  But each passage presents a notion of the human person which seems essentially superior to all the rest of the cosmos and—at least in Ficino and Mirandola—essentially creative, as well.

How does this alter the relation of the human being to the rest of the cosmos?  What influence might be taken from these ideas—and what consequences?

What is “Dignity”?

Join us this Wednesday (12 March 2025) for our Philosophical Happy Hour (5:45–7:15pm ET; latecomers welcome!) to discuss the idea of human dignity in general, and especially as conveyed through these passages.


[1] Quoted from Cassirer et al. 1956: The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, 44.

[2] Ficino 1474: Theologia Platonica, XIII.3 (219P): “Denique homo omnia divinae natura opera imitatur: et naturae inferioris opera perficit, corrigit & emendat.  Similis ergo serme vis hominis est naturae divinae: quandoquidem homo per seipsum id est, per suum consilium atque artem regit seipsum, a corporalis naturae limitibus minime circumscriptum: et singula naturae altioris opera aemulatur.”  Translation my own.

[3] Mirandola 1489: On the Dignity of Man (Wallis trans.), 5.

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