2024 Winter: Good and Freedom in Aquinas’ De Veritate

Why do we call a thing “good”?  We have been calling things good since childhood, but, as with any conception so fundamental, it is challenging to unfold its meaning.  Given the multifarious use of this name, “good”, is there even a unity of meaning to discover?  Is it just that we call anything good merely…

Why do we call a thing “good”?  We have been calling things good since childhood, but, as with any conception so fundamental, it is challenging to unfold its meaning.  Given the multifarious use of this name, “good”, is there even a unity of meaning to discover?  Is it just that we call anything good merely because it occasions feelings of a certain kind, or is there something in things themselves that justifies calling them good? 

Thomas Aquinas proposes that, indeed, the conception of the good has a central meaning –  “that which is perfective in the manner of a final cause” – and so approves the dictum of Aristotle, that “the good is that which all seek”.

Affectivity is thus relevant to this central meaning of the good, but affectivity understood, in those beings that have it, as essentially correlated with real possibilities, with the relationship of a thing to that which would perfect or fulfill it.  This is the order to an end, or final cause – a challenge to a reductive modern paradigm in which reality contains no real possibilities, but only “actual facts” of a mechanical kind. 

In this seminar, we will follow Aquinas’s treatment of the good in questions 21-26 of his great work known as De veritate.  Our considerations will include the metaphysics of the good, the divine will, and the human faculties that engage with the good, namely human will and the capacity for free choice, and human sensuality.  We will also touch on the connections between some important passages in De veritate and the topic of evil. 

Therefore, among these three things that Augustine affirms, the last one, namely order, is the relation which the name of goodness implies. But the other two, that is species and mode, cause that relation. For species pertains to the very notion of the species which, inasmuch as it has being in another, is received in some determinate mode, since whatever exists in another exists within it in the manner of the receiver. Therefore, every good thing, inasmuch as it is perfective with respect to the notion of species and being, as taken together, has mode, species, and order. It has species with respect to the notion itself of species, it has mode with respect to existence, and order with respect to the condition of what perfects.

Thomas Aquinas i.1256-59: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q.21, a.6, c.

Registration

Leave a Reply

Discover more from Lyceum Institute

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading